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ABSTRACT
Policy Analysis: Evaluating Theories 
of the Hermeneutic Critique
by
Cecilea Mun
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair 
Emeritus Professor of Ethics and Policy Studies 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis evaluates three theories representing the three perspectives identified by 
Goktug Morçôl as perspectives of the hermeneutic critique in policy analysis, while 
explicating the revolutionary process that the science is currently undergoing. The 
evaluation is focused around the question as to whether the three theories are viable 
alternatives to positivist theories. First, a brief history of policy analysis is presented, 
highlighting the conditions that contributed to the rise of the general positivist paradigm 
as the ideal in policy analysis. This is followed by a summary and criticisms of the 
general positivist paradigm. Next, summaries of Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory, 
Deborah Stone’s policy analysis as craft theory, and Frank Fischer’s discursive theory are 
presented as representatives of the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique. 
Finally, an evaluation is offered of the three theories based on their ability to overcome 
the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm.
in
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Brief History of Policy Analysis 
Policy analysis in a broad sense is “a form of applied research carried out to acquire a 
deeper understanding of sociotechnical issues and to bring about better solutions.”' The 
history of policy analysis traces back to ancient times.^ According to Stuart Nagel, “one 
can find implicit policy analysis in the legal rules of Babylonians, the ancient Hebrews, 
and the Egyptians, as well as in written and unwritten legal systems of ancient groups in 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa.”  ^ Since then, policy analysis has evolved in various 
ways. Its evolution has been a product of philosophical, historical, political, and social 
influences. It has been influenced by political philosophers since the Renaissance, and 
nineteenth and twentieth century political and social thinkers, leaders and philosophers."'
In the early twentieth century, policy analysis began to develop professional identities 
apart from that of political philosophy and sociology. Harold Lasswell was especially 
influential in the evolution of policy analysis. Deemed “The Modem Day Founder of
’ E.S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions, 2d ed. (New York: Elsevier Science 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 5.
 ^Stuart S. Nagel, Policy Studies: Integration and Evaluation, (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1988).
 ^ Ibid., 214.
 ^Ibid., 214-215.
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Policy Science,” policy analysis as envisioned by Lasswell can be understood as the seed 
of contemporary policy analysis/ Lasswell presented a sweeping vision of policy 
sciences that at the same time sparked development in the new field and led to the 
stereotyping of his ideas as utopian/
According to Lasswell’s vision, “the policy sciences would be eoneemed with the 
‘fundamental problems of man in society’ (Lemer and Lasswell, 1951:8)” and “[they] 
were to break from the past.”’ According to Garson, “Lasswell defined the policy 
scientist as one who was concerned with mastering the skills appropriate to enlightened 
decision in the context of public and civic order. In this definition, skills became 
emphasized in the field of policy analysis. Context -historical, cross-cultural, multi­
method—represented a deep commitment in Lasswell’s concept of policy science, but 
one which was obscured by sweeping projections of empirical skills.”  ^ Thus, Lasswell’s 
single vision of policy analysis, in that it realized both humanistic and behavioralistic 
assumptions, can be understood as the point before the theoretical divide in policy 
analysis—the division between synoptic and anti-synoptic, positivist and postpositivist, 
or, as defined by Frank Fischer, empiricist and postempiricist approaches. ^
 ^ ‘Policy science’ has often been used to refer to positivist policy analysis. The term 
‘technocratic policy analysis’ has also been used this way.
 ^G. David Garson, “From Policy Science to Policy Analysis,” ed. W. Dunn, Policy 
Analysis: Perspectives, Concepts, and Methods (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press Inc., 1986).
’ Ibid., 6.
® Ibid., 7.
 ^Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 
2003) 1-16. By permission of Oxford University Press.
2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Since Lasswell’s time, policy analysis, as a field of study and profession, enjoyed
tremendous growth. This growth was attributed by Nagel to three factors: “(1) the
intense eoneem with policy problems in the late 1960s; (2) the development of new
analytic and interdisciplinary methods that could be applied to evaluating alternative
policies; and (3) the increasing attractiveness of government as an employer and research
sponsor in the eyes of the contracting academic community.”'*' In the following passage,
Nagel further illustrates the influence of these three factors to the growth of
contemporary policy analysis in general:
The general growth in policy studies which began about 1971 had been stimulated 
by what may be regarded as pushing, enabling, and pulling factors. The pushing 
factors, or social forces, included the intense concern as of 1970 for policy 
problems in the areas of civil rights, poverty, Vietnam, women’s liberation, and 
environmental protection. In the later 1970s the public shifted to an increased, 
and still quite intense, concern about inflation, energy, productivity, and the 
Middle East. Before the social sciences could convert such pushing factors into 
meaningful policy analysis products, they needed better methods, interdisciplinary 
relations, data banks, and data processing equipment, which have been developed 
over the last twenty years. Policy Analysis has also been stimulated by the 
increased attractiveness, or pull, of government as a source of research funding 
and job opportunities as well as by government’s increased concern for deriving 
greater output from reduced tax dollars."
Although policy analysis in general (field, theory, and practice) grew much more than 
it had in the past during these times, and its importance to society and government was 
being realized to a greater extent, this growth was primarily focused around the positivist 
or, as Garson refers to it, the synoptic tradition. According to Garson, three powerful 
forces supported the synoptic tradition. As Garson explains, “First, it rode on the crest of
Stuart Nagel, Contemporary Public Policy Analysis (University, AL: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1984), xiii.
"  Ibid., 13.
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behavioral revolution in the political and social sciences, with its interdisciplinary 
emphasis, focus on quantitative precision, and goal of systematic empirical theory (See 
Ranney, ed., 1962). Second, it retained some of the mantle of legitimacy of the vision of 
service to national planning conferred on it by Lasswell, Merriam, and others...[and 
third,] the social ferment of the 1960s led to intense criticism of the pluralist 
alternative.” '^ Thus, given these powerful forces and those factors that contributed to the 
growth of policy analysis in general, the synoptic tradition—positivist or empiricist 
approaches to policy analysis—became realized as the ideal model for policy analysis.'^ 
Brian Fay also notes two historical factors regarding the evolution of positivist policy 
analysis.'"' First, Fay discusses the historical context in which the factors and forces 
mentioned by Garson and Nagel are to have led to the growth of positivist policy
Garson, 10. By ‘pluralist alternatives’ Garson is referring to the ‘anti-synoptic 
tradition.’ And, according to Anne Larason Schneider and Hellen Ingram, “The 
appropriate role of government in society, according to pluralist theories, is to produce 
public policies that represent interests of the electorate, resolve conflicts, reflect 
reasonable compromises among competing perspectives, and ensure the continued 
stability of the collectivity along with its preferred economic cultural characteristics” 
{Policy Design for Democracy, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997, 13). 
Used with permission of Kansas University Press and coauthor Helen Ingram.
As Schneider and Ingram further note, such authors as Ted Lowi offered the kind of 
intense criticisms referred to by Garson in the above passage. They explain how “During 
three decades of writing Lowi has argued that the competition among interest groups that 
pluralist theory holds as a necessary feature of democracy does not exist in the United 
States. Lowi (1964) contended that the pluralist vision of democracy as a competition 
among a large number of relatively equal groups has been replaced with ‘interest group 
liberalism’ in which powerful groups capture the policy-making and implementation 
process. Interest group liberalism cannot achieve rational policy results (because it is 
unable to say ‘no’ to anyone) nor can it address issues of justice (because the state is 
mainly the tool of powerful interests)” (Ibid., 22).
Garson, II.
'"' Brian Fay, Social Science and Political Practice (London: George Allan and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1975). Used with permission of author.
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analysis. According to Fay, “the idea of a policy science arose, and has been embedded,
only in the context of industrial society.”'  ^ The advancement of science and technology
in modem industrial society led not only to a conceptual change of the stmcture of order
and authority from pre-industrial society of religion to the modem industrial society of
science and technology, but it also led to the advancement of a social science founded
upon a paradigm believed to be that of the natural sciences—the positivist paradigm.'^
Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, had best articulated a second factor that
lead to the adoption of a positivist social science. Fay notes that Comte concluded that:
men’s attitudes themselves change as a result of the spread of the conceptual 
assumptions inherent in natural science. For obvious reasons these changes make 
obsolete or ineffective the religion or magic or traditional justifications from 
authority which in pre-industrial societies had promoted order, established status, 
set communal goals, and legitimated authority. Science deprives men of the old 
faith by which they lived and thus helps to destroy their old social order; thus, it 
can cause suffering and a sense of helplessness in the face of this suffering. It is 
for this reason that a new faith, one compatible with and arising out of the 
scientific spirit, must emerge from this chaos and lead men out of the void into 
which they had been thrown."
In policy analysis, this new faith was provided by the positivist paradigm—a paradigm
that distinguishes between facts and values as knowable and not knowable, that believes
knowledge is based on observation and can be objective, and that utilizes scientific
methods for inquiry.
15 Ibid., 58.
Ibid., 18-20.
17 Ibid., 20.
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Thesis Questions
The positivist paradigm for policy analysis, what is still known today as the dominant 
paradigm in policy analysis, has been under critical attack by theorists and practitioners 
alike. Authors such has Brian Fay, Dvora Yanow, Deborah Stone, Frank Fischer, John 
Forester, Martin Rein, M.E. Hawkesworth, Anne Larason Schneider, Helen Ingram, and 
Rosemarie Tong have offered several criticisms regarding the positivist paradigm in 
policy analysis. In response to these criticisms, theorists and practitioners of policy 
analysis have offered or attempted to formulate various theories of policy analysis that 
address the shortcomings of positivist theories. These alternative theories came to be 
known as postpositivist theories or postempiricist theories. Although there are many 
variations of postpositivist theories, they can be distinguished from positivist theories 
based on their reliance on a similar paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm. In 
addition, some current offerings of postpositivist alternatives can be viewed as modem 
versions of the anti-synoptie tradition, or neo-pluralist theories. In this, we can 
understand some of the current offerings of postpositivist theories as a return to the anti­
synoptic or pluralist traditions of the past.
The question that concerns this thesis is: are postpositivist theories viable alternatives 
to positivist theories? Within the context of the scientific revolution that the science of 
policy analysis is currently undergoing, this question is concerned with the question of 
whether the success of postpositivist theories, in overcoming the challenges presented by 
the criticisms of positivist theories, warrants us to reject the positivist paradigm for the 
general postpositivist paradigm? In other words, are there good reasons for accepting the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
general postpositivist paradigm as the new dominant paradigm, thereby calling for a 
revolution in the science of policy analysis?
Due to practical constraints, the scope of this paper will be limited to only three 
postpositivist theories; Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory, Deborah Stone’s theory of 
policy analysis as craft, and Frank Fischer’s discursive theory. Each of these theories 
represents the three theoretical perspectives Goktug Morçôl identifies as perspectives of 
the hermeneutic critique, which he claims to be arguably the most coherent theoretical 
stream of postpositivist theories.*^ In evaluating these three theories, this thesis asks 
whether: (1) these theories, each representing one of the three perspectives of the 
hermeneutic critique, undertake to overcome the criticisms that positivist theories have 
been charged? (2) If they do so adequately, then where is this success located? In other 
words, is their success in overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been 
charged due specifically to paradigm shifts? (3) If not, at what point do postpositivist 
theories also succumb to the criticisms faced by positivist theories? And (4) are these 
postpositivist theories subject to problems of their own, possibly arising from their 
alternative paradigm?
Goktug Morçôl, A New Mind For Policy Analysis: Toward a Post-Newtonian and 
Postpositivist Epistemology and Methodology (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002). 
As Morçôl notes, “I group postpositivist theories in the policy analysis literature into five 
theory streams: contextuality and presupposition theories, hermeneutic critique, problem 
structuring and issue framing theories, methodological critique, and participatory policy 
analysis. Arguably, among these theory streams, the hermeneutic critique presents the 
most coherent perspective.. .There are three distinguishable, but overlapping, theoretical 
perspectives within the hermeneutic critique: phenomenological/interpretive theories, 
discourse theory, and critical theory” (Morçôl, 104-106).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Outline of Chapters 
In the beginning of Chapter I, we were introduced to a brief history of how the 
positivist paradigm became the dominant paradigm for policy analysis. This chapter was 
an introduction to the conditions that led to the establishment of policy analysis in the 
phase of normal science in the broader sense of a scientific revolution. As Thomas S. 
Kuhn notes, before there is a revolution in a field of science, there is first a time of 
‘normal science.’"  After the establishment of the positivist paradigm as the dominant 
paradigm in policy analysis, the field of policy analysis enjoyed a period of normal 
science. The positivist paradigm served as the foundation for succeeding generations and 
practitioners to carry out policy analysis.
Chapter II will provide a general outline of the positivist paradigm for policy analysis 
along with some of the criticisms with which this paradigm, and its resulting theories 
have been charged. In the broader sense of the revolution of the science of policy 
analysis, this chapter introduces the kinds of criticisms that have slowly led many 
theorists and practitioners to abandon the positivist paradigm for policy analysis. These 
criticisms are founded upon the recognition that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis
"  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 3d ed., (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). ‘Normal science,’ as Kuhn continues, “means 
research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that 
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice” (Ibid., 10). These achievements “served for a time 
implicitly to define the legitimate problems and methods of research for a field for 
succeeding generations and practitioners,’ and they were able to do so because ‘the 
achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents 
away from competing modes of scientific activity’ and ‘it was sufficiently open ended to 
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (Ibid.). 
Kuhn refers to the achievements that share these two characteristics as ‘paradigms’ 
(Ibid).
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are value-laden. This is similar to what Kuhn describes as the discovery of anomalies/*' 
and led to a crisis in the field of policy analysis—a crisis in which theorists and 
practitioners began to question the adequacy of the dominant positivist paradigm for 
policy analysis. As Kuhn explains, these kinds of abandonment of a dominant paradigm 
“are the pivots about which scientific revolutions tum.” '^
Chapter III introduces three theories that are to represent the three perspectives of the 
hermeneutic critique. The theories are: Yanow’s interpretive theory as a representative of 
the interpretive/phenomenological perspective, Stone’s craft theory as a representative of 
the discourse perspective, and Fischer’s discursive theory as a representative of the 
critical perspective. These theories are presented as three distinct postpositivist theories, 
all sharing the same postpositivist paradigm.
In the broader sense, this chapter is an introduction to the end of crisis in the field of 
policy analysis. As Kuhn notes, the end of crisis can occur in three ways, one of which is 
“the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and the ensuing battle over its 
aceeptance.”^^  Thus, as this chapter introduces three theories, and their alternative 
paradigm, that have been developed in response to the criticisms of positivist theories, it 
at the same time introduces the new candidate paradigm for policy analysis, which marks 
the end of crisis within the process of revolution for the science of policy analysis.
Chapter IV presents the evaluations of the three theories representing the three 
theoretical perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. The evaluations are focused around
20 Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 84.
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four specific challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of policy 
analysis. These challenges are: (1) the challenge of overcoming the ontological and 
epistemological tenets of the faet-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge of providing a 
democratic process of decision-making within their method of policy analysis, (3) the 
challenge of providing a coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the challenge of 
resolving the problem of policy analysis as ideology.
In the broader sense, this chapter is a contribution to the revolutionary process of the 
science of policy analysis by adding to the ensuing battle over the acceptance of the new 
candidate paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm. As stated by Kuhn, “The 
resulting transition to a new paradigm is scientific revolution,”^^  but this transition cannot 
occur until alternative paradigms have been evaluated as well; until it has been 
established that these alternative paradigms are more worthy of aeeeptanee than the 
dominant positivist paradigm for policy analysis. As Kuhn notes, “Paradigms gain their 
status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems 
that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.” "^'
Finally, Chapter V is the concluding chapter to this thesis. This chapter begins with a 
summary of the four previous chapters. Then it moves on to address the major questions 
considered by this thesis. It answers the questions as to whether: (1) these theories, each 
representing one of the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique, undertake to 
overcome the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged? (2) If they do so 
adequately, then where is this success located? In other words, is their success in
23 Ibid., 90.
Ibid., 23.
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overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged due specifically to 
paradigm shifts? (3) If not, at what point do postpositivist theories also succumb to the 
criticisms faced by positivist theories? And (4) are these postpositivist theories subject to 
problems of their own, possibly arising from their alternative paradigm? Finally, it 
concludes with possible recommendations for the formulation of theories of policy 
analysis.
In answering the major questions considered by this thesis, it is apparent that theories 
of the hermeneutic critique, although agreeing on a similar general paradigm for policy 
analysis, disagree in some respect as to the legitimate methods for policy analysis. Yet, 
this discrepancy does not alter the possible acceptance of their general postpositivist 
paradigm. As Kuhn notes, “[scientists] can, that is, agree in their identification of a 
paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or 
rationalization of it.”^^
In the broader sense of the scientific revolution of policy analysis, this chapter argues 
for the aeeeptanee of the new candidate as the new paradigm for policy analysis. It 
argues for the need to move beyond the positivist paradigm of policy analysis to the 
general postpositivist paradigm. In essence, it calls for a revolution in the science of 
policy analysis.
Ibid., 44.
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CHAPTER II
THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM 
AND CRITICISMS 
The Positivist Paradigm for Policy Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the three factors Nagel identified as contributing to the 
growth of policy analysis in general, and the factors noted by Garson and Fay regarding 
the growth of positivist policy analysis,' established the positivist paradigm for policy 
analysis as the dominant paradigm during the mid- to late-twentieth century/
In the following sections, I will first offer a summary of the major tenets that 
constitute the general positivist paradigm. I will first explicate the major ontological 
tenets of the positivist paradigm, then move on to the epistemological tenets, and finally 
to the methodological tenets. By doing so, we will be able to see how the ontological 
tenets lead to certain epistemological tenets, and how these epistemological tenets lead to
Nagel, 13; Garson, 10; Fay, 18-20.
 ^According to a recent study by Morçôl, “policy professionals are not monolithieally 
positivistic in their beliefs, but there is a considerable degree of support for positivistic 
positions among them, especially among practitioners and those professionals whose 
educational backgrounds are in economies, mathematics, and science” (Morçôl, 
“Positivist Beliefs Among Policy Professionals; An Empirical Investigation”, Policy 
Sciences, vol. 34, 2001: 395).
12
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methodological tenets. I will then offer some of the major arguments against the general 
positivist paradigm.^
Later on, in Chapter III, the explication of the major tenets of the three theories 
representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique will be carried out in this 
same manner. This allows us to locate the differences between the tenets of the positivist 
paradigm and those of the three theories representing the three perspectives of the 
hermeneutic critique.
In understanding the general tenets behind positivist theories of policy analysis, and 
the criticisms of these tenets, we will come to understand how the theories, referred to by 
Morçôl as theories of the hermeneutic critique, are among the theories formulated in 
response to the positivist paradigm and their criticisms. Thus, we will come to 
understand how these criticisms have led to the abandonment of the dominant positivist 
paradigm for policy analysis—the pivots on which the revolution of the science of policy 
analysis is turning.
1. Ontology
According to the Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “The word ‘ontology’ is 
used to refer to the philosophical investigation of existence, or being. Such investigation 
may be directed towards the concept of being, asking what ‘being’ means, or what it is 
for something to exist; it may also (or instead) be eoneemed with the question ‘what
 ^It may be said that some of the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm offered 
in this chapter may not be applicable to some positivist theories, yet it must be 
understood that these criticisms are against the general understanding of positivist 
theories, and the general paradigm that they may share. As mentioned, there are 
numerous variations of positivist theories, and the paradigm presented in this chapter may 
not necessarily be held by all positivist theories. Nor are criticisms presented necessarily 
applicable to all positivist theories.
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exists?’ or ‘what general sorts of things there are?”’"* Also noted by the Routledge 
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “It is eommon to speak of a philosopher’s ontology, 
meaning the kinds of thing they take to exist, or ontology of a theory, meaning the things 
that would have to exist for that theory to be true.”^
This second eommon usage of ontology, the ontology of a theory, is what is referred 
to in this section regarding the ontology of positivist theories of policy analysis/ Thus, 
the following presuppositions are the major tenets regarding the categories of things that 
are assumed to exist, according to positivist theories of policy analysis, for the theories to 
be able to bear out their implications. This usage of ontology is also what is referred to 
later on in Chapter III regarding the ontology of the three theories representing the three 
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique: Yanow’s interpretive theory. Stone’s analysis as 
craft theory, and Fischer’s discursive theory.
"* Edward Craig, “Ontology”, in Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, para.l, 1998- 
2004, [encyclopedia on-line]; available from
http://www.rep.routledge.eom/articla/N039.html, Internet; accessed 4 May 2004.
 ^Ibid.
 ^Carl G. Hempel, a prominent figure in the philosophy of science and a former 
member of the Vienna Cirele, refers to these ontologieal tenets as ‘internal prineiples.’
As he explains, internal principles “characterize the basic entities and processes invoked 
by the theory and the laws to which they are assumed to conform” (Carl G. Hempel, 
Philosophy o f Natural Science, Foundation of Philosophy Series, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, 72). HEMPEL, CARL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL 
SCIENCE, 1st Edition, © 1966. Reprinted by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., 
Upper Saddle River, NJ.
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a) Ontological Tenet of the 
Fact-Value Dichotomy 
One of the major ontological tenets held by positivist theories of policy analysis is the 
faet-value dichotomy. According to the ontological tenet of the fact value-dichotomy, 
there are two general categories of things that exist: physical objects and value claims. 
Physical objects, simply put, are objects that have physical existence (location and 
dimensions). These physical objects yield facts, which are prepositional statements of 
knowledge that are supported by empirical evidence or data derived from observation of 
physical objects. Value claims are those statements that cannot be support by physical 
objects alone. In general, value claims are statements of belief that entail values or 
normative criteria, interpretations, and meanings, such as ‘it is wrong to lie’ or ‘ice cream 
is good.’
Yet, the ontological tenet of the faet-value dichotomy is not only the claim that fact 
that there are two general categories of things, physical objects and value claims, but it is 
also about how these categories of things are separated into categories of objects that can 
yield knowledge or only nonsense. According to the ontological tenet of the faet-value 
dichotomy, only physical objects are objects of knowledge, whereas value claims are not. 
Thus, the ontologieal tenet of the faet-value dichotomy implies epistemological 
assumptions that limit inquiry the kinds of objects for inquiry in positivist policy analysis 
to physical objects by obviating inquiry into value-elaims.
b) The Tenet of Universal Laws 
Another ontologieal tenet of positivist theories of policy analysis is that universal 
laws exist. This second tenet is not only evident in their epistemological and
15
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methodological tenets, but it is also a tenet that reflects the hope of what can be
accomplished by positivist social science—the hope of social engineering. As Martin
Rein notes, according to the view of positivist social science:
The only effective way to manage the difficulties presented by man’s social 
environment is through the systematic application of the ‘scientific method.’ We 
know that this method has been used effectively in the natural sciences to win 
control over the physical environment. If social science can apply these 
techniques of analysis to social understanding, it may also acquire some of the 
powerful predictive capabilities of the natural sciences. The influence of social 
science, therefore, depends on its ability to discover general laws of social 
processes which will eventually enable man to control his social environment.^
As we will see later on, universal laws of social phenomena are usually explicated in
the deductive-nomological form or the laws of probabilistic form. These universal laws,
explicated in deductive-nomological form or the laws of probabilistic form, deal
specifically with the correlation between or among physical objects or things that are
reducible to physical objects. Once tested and proven to an acceptable degree, they
become what are known to be scientific laws. In this sense, they become facts, or
propositional statements of knowledge about the correlation between physical objects that
are supported by empirical evidence.
2. Epistemology
According to the Cambridge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, epistemology is “the study 
of the nature of knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of (a) the defining 
features; (b) the substantive conditions, and (c) the limits of knowledge and
’ Martin Rein, Social Science and Public Policy (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1976), 39.
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justification.”* Thus, this section asks, ‘given the ontology of positivist paradigms, the 
category of things that are assumed to exist, what are the criteria for knowledge for the 
category of things that are assumed to exist?’ This is the meaning of epistemology also 
referred to in the following chapter regarding the epistemology of the three theories 
representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique.
a) Epistemological Tenet of the 
Fact-Value Dichotomy 
One of the major epistemological tenets of the positivist paradigm is the assumption 
of the fact-value dichotomy. This is the assumption that, “All knowledge was believed to 
depend on observation, thus any claims, whether theological, metaphysical, 
philosophical, ethical, normative, or aesthetic, which were not rooted in empirical 
observation, were rejected as meaningless.”  ^ This tenet is founded upon the verification 
criterion of meaning, which “stipulated that a contingent criterion of meaning is 
meaningful if, and only if, it could be empirically verified.” '*’ Therefore, according to the 
epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy only facts, which are supported by 
empirical evidence, can be meaningful and so be knowledge. Those propositional 
statements that are supported by value claims are regarded as meaningless, and so cannot 
be items of knowledge. Thus, according to the epistemological tenet of the fact-value
* Paul K. Moser, “Epistemology”, ed. R. Audi, in The Cambridge Dictionary o f  
Philosophy, 2d ed. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273.
 ^M.E. Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1988), 38.
Ibid.
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dichotomy, the appropriate objects of inquiry are physical objects, and only facts can be 
knowledge.
b) Characteristics of Knowledge 
Derived from their ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value 
dichotomy, positivist theories of policy analysis conclude that one can obtain knowledge 
that is free of politics and individual biases. According to Hawkesworth, “Mutually 
reinforcing empiricist [or positivist] assumptions dispel questions concerning the political 
cast of empiricist commitments by providing a formula for preserving the objectivity of 
scientific investigations and for insulating scientific research from the taint of politics.”"  
As noted by Richard S. Rudner, the word ‘objective’ “has been used, in fact, to apply to 
at least four different things: (1) the verisimilitude of ideas, i.e., the replicalike character 
of mental imagery, (2) the truth of statements, (3) the reliability of methodologies, and 
(4) the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or believe, or employ the 
kinds of ideas, statements, or methodologies mentioned under 1,2, or 3.”'^ Here, 
Hawkesworth is referring to the third use of ‘objectivity’ defined by Rudner. Thus, it is 
concluded that because the reliability of scientific investigation is preserved and scientific 
research is insulated from political taint, that the results of such research—the knowledge 
gained ifom such research—would be ‘objective’ in regard to the truth of the statements. 
Any other claims are ‘subjective.’
"ib id ., 3.
Richard S. Rudner, “On the Objectivity of Social Science,” ed. G. Riley, in Values, 
Objectivity, and the Social Sciences (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 
1974), 40-41.
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c) Purpose of Inquiry
Another major epistemological tenet held by positivist theories of policy analysis in
general is the belief that “the task of science [is] understood to consist in the inductive
discovery of regularities which [exist] in the external world.” These regularities,
understood as scientific laws provide:
The foundation for scientific explanation, which according to the precepts of the 
Covering Law model [the causal model of explanation], consisted in 
demonstrating that the events to be explained could have been expected, given 
certain initial conditions.. .and the general laws of the field.... Within the 
framework of the positivist conception of science, the discovery of scientific laws 
also provided the foundation for prediction which consisted in demonstrating that 
an event would occur given the future occurrence of certain initial conditions and 
the operations of the general laws of the field."
Thus, according to this tenet, scientific explanation is to be in the form of a deductive-
nomological explanation, also referred to as the Covering Law model of explanation.
Yet, according to Hempel, this is not the only form that scientific explanations can
take. The deductive-nomological form of scientific explanation provides the strongest
sense of an explanation, for “in deductive inferences from tme premises [as in deductive-
nomological explanations], the conclusion is invariably true.”'  ^ Another form of
explanation that a scientific explanation can take is, as Hempel states, o f
probabilistic form  or probabilistic laws, for short.” According to Hempel,
A probabilistic explanation of a particular event shares certain basic 
characteristics with the corresponding deductive-nomological type of explanation.
13 Hawkesworth, 38.
Ibid., 39
15 Hempel, 58
Ibid.
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In both cases, the event is explained in reference to others, with which the 
explanandum event is connected by laws. But in one case, the laws are of 
universal form; in the other, of probabilistic form. And while the deductive 
explanation shows that, on the information contained in the explanans, the 
explanandum was to be expected with ‘deductive certainty’, an inductive 
explanation shows only that, on the information contained in the explanans, the 
explanandum was to be expected with high probability, and perhaps with 
“practical certainty.”"
Thus, according to positivist theories of policy analysis, knowledge of social phenomena
is to be explicated in the deductive-nomological form or the form of probabilistic laws.
The basis of both of these forms of knowledge is that they denote patterns or regularities
of physical objects, and can be verified at least in principle by empirical evidence.
In order to explicate a social phenomenon in terms of deductive-nomological form or
the form of probabilistic laws, positivist theories of policy analysis in general require that
the explanation of the social phenomenon must meet the verification criterion of
meaning. Again, this is the criterion that, “A contingent proposition is meaningful if, and
only if, it could be empirically verified.”'* In order for a proposition to be empirically
verifiable, the proposition must meet the two criteria of scientific explanation: the
criterion of explanatory relevance and the criterion of testability.
According to Hempel, the criterion of explanatory relevance requires that “the
explanatory information adduced affords good grounds for believing that the
phenomenon to be explained did, or does, indeed occur.”"’ ‘Good grounds’, according to
Hempel requires a physical account of the phenomenon. As Hempel explains with his
"  Ibid., 59
'* Hawkesworth, 38. 
Hempel, 48.
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example of the scientific explanation of a rainbow, “The explanatory information
provided by the physical account would constitute good grounds for expecting or
believing that a rainbow will appear under the specific circumstances.” *^’ This is a
tautological explanation of ‘good grounds.’ ‘Good grounds’ is the physical account of a
phenomenon. Thus, only those objects that can be given physical accounts or reducible
to physical accounts can produce knowledge that meet the criterion of explanatory
relevance. This then makes value claims ontologically dependent. In essence, the
criterion of explanatory relevance limits the scope of inquiry to physical objects or those
things reducible to physical objects.
The criterion of testability claims that, “The statements constituting a scientific
explanation must be capable of empirical test.” '^ This criterion assumes that an
explanation in which “no empirical findings could possibly bear it out or disconfirm it’ is
‘devoid of empirical content’ and therefore ‘affords no grounds for expecting the
characteristic ph en o me n o n . T h u s ,  any finding that fails to meet the criterion of
testability is considered to lack “objective explanatory power”;^  ^it is unable to yield any
causal explanation in the form of a deductive-nomological explanation, or probabilistic
law, and is therefore useless to scientific inquiry. As Hempel explains:
If a statement or set of statements is not testable at least in principle, in other 
words, if it has no test implications at all [in that there are no empirical data to 
refer to], then it cannot be significantly proposed or entertained as a scientific
*^’ Ibid.
"  Ibid., 49. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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hypothesis or theory, for no conceivable empirical finding can then accord or 
conflict with it. In this case, it has no bearing whatever on empirical 
phenomenon, or as we will say, it lacks empirical import?'^
In other words, any causal explanation that lacks empirical import, is not empirically 
testable, and cannot be maintained as a significant scientific explanation since the 
explanation cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed through scientific testing—it cannot be 
shown to be true or false. And, as Hempel notes, “deductive-nomological explanations 
satisfy the requirements of explanatory relevance in the strongest sense: the explanatory 
information they provide implies the explanandum sentence deductively offers logically 
conclusive grounds why the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected.”^^
Probabilistic laws are also thought to meet the two requirements of relevancy and 
testability for a scientific explanation, though they are believed to do so to a lesser 
degree, for they employ the logic of inductive reasoning rather than deductive reasoning.
Thus, also according to the criterion of testability, only physical objects, or those 
objects that can be reduced to physical objects, can yield knowledge, since only physical 
objects have empirical import and so, are testable.
3. Methodology
Also according to the Cambridge Dictionary o f  Philosophy, methodology is a branch 
of the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of science is “the branch of philosophy 
that is centered on a critical examination of the sciences: their methods and their results. 
[The branch of methodology] explores the methods by which science arrives at its posited
24 Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 52. By ‘explanandum sentence’, Hempel means “the sentence describing [the 
phenomenon]...’ and by explanandum phenomenon, Hempel means ‘the phenomenon to 
be accounted for by an explanation” (Ibid., 50).
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truths concerning the world and critically explores alleged rationales for these 
methods.”^^  Thus, the question regarding methodology addressed in the following 
section is, ‘what are the major tenets of the positivist paradigm in regard to the methods 
of inquiry for obtaining knowledge of those category of things that are assumed to exist?’ 
A similar question is addressed in Chapter III regarding the methods of the three theories 
representing the three perspective of the hermeneutic critique.
a) The Positivist Tenet of the Unity of Science 
Methodologically, positivist theories of policy analysis uphold the unity of science. 
This is the tenet that “the logic of scientific inquiry was the same for all fields. Whether 
natural phenomena or social phenomena were the objects of study, the method for 
acquiring valid knowledge and the requirements for explanation and prediction remained 
the same.” ’^ It is important to note here, that the positivist’s tenet of the unity of science 
specifically entails that the appropriate paradigm for natural and social science is the 
paradigm used for natural science. This tenet leads to the subsumption of methods 
analogous to the scientific method of inquiry within the positivist paradigm for policy 
analysis.
Lawrence Sklar, “Philosophy of Science”, ed. R. Audi, in The Cambridge 
Dictionary o f Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 700.
Hawkesworth, 39.
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b) The Tenet of the Rational Model 
of Decision-Making
The subsumption of a method of inquiry analogous to what Hempel refers to as the 
method o f hypothesis leads theories of positivist policy analysis to use models of rational 
decision-making as methods for policy analysis/*
As Hempel explains:
Scientific Knowledge, as we have seen, is not arrived at by applying some 
inductive inference procedure to antecedently collected data, but rather by what is 
often called “the method of hypothesis”, i.e. by inventing hypotheses as tentative 
answers to a problem under study, and then subjecting these to empirical test. It 
will be part of such test to see whether the hypothesis is borne out by whatever 
relevant findings may have been gathered before its formulation; an acceptable 
hypothesis will have to fit the available relevant data. Another part of the test will 
consist in deriving new test implications from the hypothesis and checking these 
by suitable observations or experiments. As we noted earlier, even extensive 
testing with entirely favorable results does not establish a hypothesis 
conclusively, but provides only more or less strong support for it.^ ^
Modeled after the method of hypothesis, positivist theories of policy analysis use a
rational decision-making model of inquiry. As Jenkins-Smith explains:
In the style of the rational decision maker, the policy analyst is to use a range of 
analytical techniques and multiple fields of knowledge to engage in a number of 
distinct procedures or steps, including: (1) identifying the ‘problem’ to be 
resolved, (2) specifying the goal(s) to be sought through the public policy, (3) 
identifying or inventing the available policy alternatives, (4) estimating the effects 
of each of the alternatives, both favorable and unfavorable, (5) imputing values in 
a single, commensurable metric to those effects, and (6) choosing the ‘best’ policy 
alternative according to an explicit decision rule.^*’
*^ Hempel, 17.
Ibid., 17-18.
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis (Belmont, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990), II . Jenkins-Smith notes that “Many such lists 
of steps are enumerated in the policy analysis literature, each quite similar to the list 
presented here. See, for example, Stoky and Zeckhauser, A Primer o f Policy Analysis, pp. 
5-6; David Nachmias, Public Policy Evaluation: Approaches and Methods (New York:
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Here we see that the first three steps of the rational model of decision-making are 
similar to the first step of the method of hypothesis, that of formulating a hypothesis. The 
following two steps, steps four and five, correlate with the next step in the method of 
hypothesis, that of testing the hypothesis. The final step, step six, of choosing the ‘best’ 
policy alternative correlates with the final step within the method of hypothesis, that of 
determining whether the test implications warrant support of the hypothesis. In the case 
of the rational model of decision-making for policy analysis, to conclude that the 
empirical data or facts supports a specific policy alternative to a greater degree is to say 
that that specific policy alternative is the best in comparison to rival alternatives, just as 
in the method of hypothesis wherein experimental results are used to validate a specific 
theory that is in contest with other theories.
To further explicate the rational model of decision-making in policy analysis, it is 
important to understand that in many positivist theories of policy analysis the goals or 
objectives, and the problems, are understood to be given by the decision-maker or makers 
and are reducible to physical objects that can be quantifiably measured. As Quade notes, 
the objectives are “often stated or implied by the decision-maker.” '^ This is because 
according to the ontological and epistemological tenets of the positivist paradigm for 
policy analysis, value claims are outside the limits of their field of inquiry, yet policy
St. Martins Press, 1979) pp. 12-18; Alice Rivlin, Systematic Thinking for Social Action 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1971), pp. 3-5. The Graduate School of Public 
Policy at the University of California at Berkeley propounds a version of the above list 
called the ‘eightfold path,’ which seeks to give somewhat greater emphasis to the role of 
analysis in creating policy alternatives. For a critique of this restrictive ‘problem solving’ 
approach, see Martin Rein and Sheldon White, ‘Policy Research Belief and Doubt,’ in 
Policy Analysis, 3(2) (Spring 1977), pp. 239-271” (Ibid).
Quade, 45.
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necessarily deals with values in terms of goals or objectives. Thus, positivist theories of 
policy analysis attempt to stay within the boundaries of inquiry set by their ontological 
and epistemological tenets by leaving the determination of goals or objectives to the 
decision-maker(s), or taking them as ‘given’ by the framing of the problem.
In addition. Stone notes that there are in general five concepts that dominate the 
language of policy discourse in regards to goals: equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and 
community ‘goals.’ These vague and ambiguous concepts, as Stone continues, are often 
treated as having a single definition or criterion,^^ and this single definition or criterion is 
established by the decision-maker(s). By treating them as having a single definition or 
criterion, it is assumed that they are amenable to quantitative measurements of variables 
that are characterized by physical objects. Thus, positivist policy analysts not only 
understand goals as given by the decision-maker(s), but they are given in terms that are, 
or can be reducible to physical objects. The basis of this treatment of goals can be 
located in their ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. The 
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, as stated earlier, limit 
the scope of valid inquiry to physical objects, or those things that are reducible to 
physical objects, in order to arrive at valid knowledge.
In regard to problems, problem definition is generally understood as “a statement of a 
goal and the discrepancy between it and the status quo.”^^  In this sense, the problem is
Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision Making, rev. ed. 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002), 37. FROM POLICY PARADOX: 
The Art of Political Decision Making by Deborah Stone. Copyright © 1997,1988 by 
Deborah Stone. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Also, Used by 
permission of author.
Ibid., 133.
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also given by the decision-maker(s) and reducible to the analysis of physical objects. As 
Stone notes, defining the problem becomes “a matter of observation and arithmetic— 
measuring the difference between two states of affairs.” '^' This assumption is also 
informed by the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. 
Thus, it is believed that the discrepancy between the stated goals and the status quo can 
also be determined by quantifiable measurements of physical objects.
The steps four, five, and six within the method of rational decision-making are also 
entailed by the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. 
Although the third step of creating alternatives relies on the imagination of the analyst, 
the steps of estimating the effects of each of the alternatives, both favorable and 
unfavorable; imputing values in a single, commensurable metric to those effects; and 
choosing the ‘best’ policy alternative, or providing a hierarchy of alternatives, according 
to an explicit decision rule are highly dependent upon empirical evidence. In regard to 
estimating the effects of each alternative of the alternatives (both favorable and 
unfavorable), and imputing values in a single, commensurable metric to those effects, 
requires the analyst to “define the variables [of the social problem] in terms of specific 
indicators.”^^  In regard to choosing the ‘best’ policy alternative, or providing a hierarchy 
of alternatives, according to an explicit decision rule, most often, empirical evidence is 
sought through the quantitative analysis of the defined variables, and the criterion of
34 Ibid.
Ann Majchrzack, Methods for Policy Research, vol. 3, Applied social Research 
Methods Series (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1984). For a more detailed 
explanation of this, please see Majchrzak, Methods for Policy Research, 
“Operationalization of Variable”, 55-58.
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efficiency is used to determine which alternative is the ‘best’ alternative/^ As Fay 
explains, this is the primary concern of the positivist policy analyst, in that they are 
concerned only with determining the ‘best’ means to a given end in light of other 
alternatives.
c) Defining the Purpose of Policy Analysis
Finally, positivist theories of policy analysis, informed by their tenet of the unity of 
science and the rational model of decision-making, uphold a specific definition of policy 
analysis. As mentioned, the ultimate objective of positive policy analysis is “choosing 
the ‘best’ policy alternative according to an explicit decision rule.” '^' This leads to the 
conclusion that the main goal of policy analysis is to arrive at a specific solution, the 
‘best’ policy alternative. This conception of policy analysis necessarily entails a specific 
choice for the policy maker, that choice being the one that has been determined as the 
‘best’ in light of other alternatives.
In this sense, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis portrays policy analysis as a 
puzzle to be solved. One of the main characteristics of a puzzle is the assured existence 
of a solution.^* Thus, according to positivist conceptions of policy analysis, there is 
always a solution to any policy problem; all that is needed is the proper application of the 
accepted paradigm for the analysis of policy. In this sense, the positivist paradigm for 
policy analysis can be seen as insulating the analyst from the kinds of problems that do 
not fit the puzzle form, such as problems of conflicting values, interpretations, and
^^Fay, 50-51.
^Jenkins-Smith, 11. 
Kuhn, 37.
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meanings. As Kuhn notes, “A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the 
community [of scientists] from those socially important problems that are not reducible to 
the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and 
instrumental tools the paradigm supplies.
Criticisms of the Positivist Paradigm 
in Policy Analysis
Recently, there is resurgence and a growing acknowledgement of the criticisms 
against the general positivist paradigm in policy analysis. Much of this is due to the still 
pervasive use of positivist theories in policy analysis. Criticisms of the positivist 
paradigm of policy analysis speak not only of the flaws within the foundations of 
positivist theories of policy analysis, but also to the shortcomings of the practice of 
positivist policy analysis. One of these shortcomings has been discussed by Beryl A. 
Radin regarding the difficulties presented by the use of cost-benefit analysis, a prevalent 
method of rational decision-making used by positivist theories of policy analysis. As 
Radin notes:
There is a wide range of technical problems involved in the application of the 
cost-benefit approach. Identifying and monetizing relevant impacts and 
discounting for time and risk are much easier to accomplish when one is faced 
with a decision about building or not building a specific dam than when the 
decision involves a program administered by fifty different states. Even then, as 
Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber point out, the technique is often less 
clear-cut than it appears at first blush. The entrance of the environmental 
movement into the decision environment of the Army Corps of Engineers forced 
that agency to think about decisions that have value conflicts surrounding them.
When environmental advocates began to do their adversarial eost-benefit analysis.
Ibid.
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it became very clear that the federal government was facing policy choices 
involving value disputes, not simply technical determinations
These kinds of value disputes, which illustrate how positivist methods of policy
analysis are ill equipped at handling certain policy issues, are likened to the anomalies of
scientific discoveries discussed by Kuhn. As Kuhn notes, “Discovery commences with
the awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a
more or less exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm
theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become expected.’" ' Here then we
see that value disputes— a characteristic of the nature of many social phenomena—
violated the positivist paradigm induced expectations of the ability of such methods as
cost-benefit analysis to solve certain policy problems.
The importance of this, in the broader sense of the revolution of the science of policy
analysis, is that at times the anomalous necessitates a paradigm shift—in that the
dominant paradigm is unable, without its own destruction, to adjust itself in order to
make the anomalous expected. In policy analysis, due to the positivist paradigm’s
ontological and epistemological tenets, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis is
inherently unable to adjust itself to make issues regarding values expected. What is
important to note here is that anomalies such as value disputes that the positivist
paradigm is unable to make expected point to an inconsistency between the positivist
paradigm, and their theories, and the nature of the subject of policy analysis. This
Beryl A. Radin, Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes o f  Age (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 114.
Kuhn, 52-53.
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inconsistency between the dominant paradigm in policy analysis and the nature of social 
phenomenon sparked the kinds of criticisms of the positivist paradigm that led to its 
abandonment—the pivots on which scientific revolution turns.
Fay, in Social Theory and Political Practice, has also offered some of the criticisms 
that are rooted in the discovery of anomalies, such as value disputes, under the positivist 
paradigm for policy analysis. He criticizes positivist paradigms of policy analysis, 
arguing that: (1) the limitations placed on policy analysis by the general positivist 
paradigm reduces the task of policy analysts to simply providing means to a given end;
(2) that the idea of positivist policy analysis is incoherent; (3) that the positivist paradigm 
not only denies a democratic process of decision-making, but in that it does so, (4) it 
constitutes an ideology rooted in the values of modem industrial society and the 
dominating powers, which undermines the positivist’s claim that their analysis is non- 
ideological. Although Fay offers four arguments, he notes that the first argument is more 
a qualification upon the positivist conception of policy analysis, and not necessarily an 
argument against its coherence."*^
1. Values are within Limits of Positivist 
Policy Analysis
Fay’s first argument is that the intent of positivist policy analysts to limit their field of 
inquiry to physical objects, first results in limiting their task to simply providing means to 
a given end. He argues that policy scientists, also referred to as positivist policy analysts.
Such authors as Dvora Yanow, Deborah Stone, Frank Fischer, John Forester, 
Martin Rein, M.E. Hawkesworth, Anne Larason Schneider, Rosemarie Tong, and Helen 
Ingram have also discussed criticisms similar to Fay’s.
Fay, 51.
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seek to maintain the fact-value dichotomy by only concerning themselves with the task of
determining the ‘best’ means to a given end. As he explains:
The policy scientist carmot make all of the necessary decisions, for.. .any 
conception of the scientisation of politics must take account of the distinction 
between fact and value. This has been done by drawing another distinction 
between means and ends, the idea being the simple one that the choice of the ends 
to be pursued is thought to be a choice requiring a value judgment, but that the 
question as to the best means to a prescribed end is thought to be a factual 
question and therefore decidable scientifically. Thus, it is that the policy scientist 
is thought to be competent only in deciding the ‘best means’, which is to say that 
the social policies he recommends are those which are instrumental to achieving 
certain posited ends."
Thus, by only being concerned with the issue of determining the ‘best means’ to a given
end, it is concluded that policy scientists effectively steer clear of issues concerning
values when they are not reducible to physical objects.
Yet, as Fay argues, this task of determining the ‘best’ means to a given end requires a
standard to which one can measure various means. In the policy sciences, this standard is
often the criterion of efficiency. And, as Fay continues, “The concept of efficiency alone
cannot provide an adequate standard in terms of which objective decisions can be made,
for the concept of efficiency is a purely formal term signifying the ratio of amount of
work performed to the total energy expended, and as such it can only have content, and
therefore practical meaning, when one provides another standard in terms of which work
and energy can be identified and measured.”"*^ This implies that in deciding the ‘best
means’, the policy analyst must still address value claims, for determining the ‘best
means’ to a given end entails one to ask and the analyst to answer “efficient in terms of
44 Ibid., 49.
"  Ibid., 50.
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what?’"^ Thus, Fay concludes that limiting the task of policy analysis to determining the 
‘best’ means does not sufficiently insulate the task of the policy analyst from issues of 
values, for even when they concern themselves only with determining the ‘best’ or most 
efficient means to a given end, this task presupposes a value judgment that the analyst 
must make.
It is important to keep in mind that this argument, according to Fay, does not 
necessarily show the incoherence of positivist policy analysis, it instead argues that the 
framework of positivist policy analysis presupposes notions of values even when set at 
the sole task of considering the ‘best’ means to a given end. As Fay admits, “All my 
argument demonstrates is that the value-framework within which the policy scientist 
operates is more extensive than at first supposed -  for it now includes standards of 
judgment as well as goals.”"" And, as he continues, “within the admittedly more 
constricted region defined by this framework, however, the policy scientist can practice 
his trade.”"** One may claim that the task of the policy scientist, within its limited 
framework, now becomes the task of simply providing means to a given end."*^  The 
matter of determining which means is ‘best’ can be left to the decision-maker(s). Thus, 
by only providing means, it is assumed that the policy scientist can still maintain a fact- 
value dichotomy, but as Fay continues to argue, the positivist analyst must still obtain
"  Ibid.
47 Ibid., 51. 
"  Ibid. 
Ibid.
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some standard of judgment even when confining policy analysis to questions about 
means.
2. Incoherence of Positivist Paradigm 
for Policy Analysis
Yet, as Fay continues to argue, “the argument against the idea of scientifically 
selecting the best means is related to the relativity of ends and means, and so in this way: 
all policy scientists are willing to admit that the ends of action reflect the values of the 
person who chooses this end, but they maintain that the means to this end are all value- 
neutral, and that their worth is to be decided solely in terms of their instrumental value of 
their contribution to the achievement to the given end.’"** And, since there is no clear 
distinction between means and ends, for depending on the point of view, any means can 
be understood as an end, “If any particular course of action can be either a ‘means’ or an 
end, then it must be the case that even so-called ‘means’ reflect the values and life 
commitments of the person who supports it, since this means is itself an end from another 
perspective.” '^
As Fay continues to explain, means are political proposals, and "'All political 
proposals, no matter how instrumental, will alter and shape the personal relations of at 
least some of the members of a society, and will reflect the relative welfare of various 
classes of people; as such they embody moral notions as to what is permissible, just, or 
right in human affairs. They are a species of moral statements.”^^  Thus, the
50 Ibid., 51-52.
"  Ibid., 52.
Ibid.
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determination of means entail values, and this then makes the idea of a value-neutral 
analysis incoherent, for “attempts at bracketing values away from social policies by 
making them a part of the framework within which the policy scientist must operate 
would result, in the last analysis, in making it impossible for the policy scientist to 
propose anything.’"^
Authors such as Yanow, Stone, and Fischer, have all argued similarly that inquiry 
into determining means requires the analyst to address value claims that entail various 
values, interpretations, and meanings. These kinds of criticisms are rooted in the 
understanding that the objects of inquiry in policy analysis are necessarily value-laden, 
thus attempting to make the task of policy analysis value-neutral by attempting to simply 
provide means, results in an inconsistence between the theoiy of policy analysis and the 
nature of object of policy analysis. In this sense, it can be concluded that positivist 
theories of policy analysis are externally incoherent. The three theories representing the 
three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique—those of Yanow, Stone, and Fischer—and 
of postpositivist theories in general, specifically attempt to address this failing in 
positivist theories of policy analysis when formulating their own theories.
3. Denial of Democratic Process 
of Decision-Making
Third, Fay argues that even if it was given “that a policy scientist could impartially 
determine the most efficient means to a given end’, his argument regarding the 
incoherence of a value-neutral policy science is still applicable, for engaging ‘in this type 
of political decision-making itself betrays a certain conception of the purposes and needs
"  Ibid., 53. 
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of men which the political sphere is supposed to satisfy, and it therefore incorporates 
certain values.”"  This argument speaks specifically of the positivist paradigm’s failure 
in recognizing the importance of a democratic process within the process of political 
decision-making, and can be understood as a consequence of positivist theories’ attempts 
to remain value-neutral. As Fay continues to explain, the positivist conception of 
political decision-making, also referred to as technocratic decision-making, speaks 
against the notion of political decision-making derived from the Aristotelian conception 
of politics in which members of the society come together in order to “participate in the 
process of determining the conditions of their lives.
This Aristotelian conception of politics, unlike what has been referred to as the 
positivist’s technocratic notion of politics, “emphasises [^/c] the social character of men’s 
self consciousness, claiming that the idea men have of themselves, of what is appropriate, 
right, and fitting, of what their abilities and capacities are, of what they are worth and 
what they ought to value and aspire towards -  all of these ideas which comprise men’s 
images of themselves are a function of the social world in which they live.”^^  In that 
positivist theories of policy analysis deny this Aristotelian conception of politics, they 
deny alternative sets of interpretations or values access to the decision-making process. 
They assume that all men hold or ought to hold the same values and the same conceptions 
of themselves. Thus, the criticism that positivist theories of policy analysis deny 
democratic processes of decision-making points to the failure of positivist theories to
"  Ibid.
"  Ibid., 54.
56 Ibid., 54-55.
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recognize that people do not share the same values and conceptions of themselves. By 
assuming that people do, the analysis not only reflects a certain set of values and 
conceptions that people have of themselves, which goes against their value-neutral notion 
of policy analysis, but the resulting analysis is also ill informed.
4. Positivist’s Paradigm for Policy Analysis 
Presupposes Ideology 
Fourth, Fay argues that “the positivist paradigm is one that claims that it is non- 
ideological, i.e. it claims to be different from all other approaches to understanding 
human behavior, social institutions and history in that it is value-neutral, that its truth 
neither presupposes nor entails certain judgments on the part of the social scientist in 
order for his statements to be true.” ’^ This claim is rooted in their epistemological tenet 
that the knowledge derived from positivist inquiry is 'objective' in regard to the truth of 
the statement. Yet, as Fay continues, the positivist paradigm, by being products of 
modem industrial society, by the values that they implicitly instill, and by the reification 
of the status quo social institutions and customs of society, reflects an ideology when 
their conclusions enter the political or social realm.^*
As Fay explains there are four features of positivist policy science that contribute to 
its ideological character. The first feature is that the “idea of policy science arose, and 
has been embedded, only in the context of industrial society.”^^  Thus, positivist 
paradigms are rooted in a conception of social organization that “reinforces the policy
"  Ibid., 65. 
Ibid., 58.
Ibid.
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scientific ideal by its viewing people and their social relations in terms of their 
instrumental value, and its requiring control over social processes.’"**
The second feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories 
of policy analysis is that in seeking general laws of society in order to explain and control 
events, the positivist social scientist “views social relations as if they were processes 
which have a life of their own and which function in the way they do regardless of the 
wishes of the actors who engage in them.” '^ This feature stems from the positivist’s 
assumption of the existence of general laws of social processes, an assumption in which 
the possibility of a value-neutral policy analysis is founded. “From this perspective,’ as 
Fay continues, ‘it ought to be clear that the policy scientific approach gives to the social 
order -  which is nothing more than the conventional activities of its members, together 
with their beliefs, expectations and desires -  the qualities of an object which exists 
irrespective of the ideas of men.”^^  Thus, the policy scientist by accepting these social 
arrangements as necessary, reify “either the basic structures of the society being studied, 
those fundamental institutions, customs, habits, and ideas which give to this society its 
distinctive identity (in the case of laws which are applicable to a given society), or certain 
recurring structural relationships (in the case of laws which purportedly apply to all forms 
of social organization, and which are instantiated in the society under question in some 
way).”^^
Ibid.
Ibid., 59. 
Ibid.
“  Ibid., 59-60.
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The third feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories of 
policy analysis is in their assumption of “the twin assumptions that a scientific approach 
in political life can ensure a rational solution to political problems, and that only 
questions of means, or instrumental questions, are amenable to a scientific solution.”"  
Thus, criticism of the societal means, ends, and values, would be severely limited, 
thereby reinforcing the continued existence of such a society.
This feature stems from the assumption of the unity of science, and the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of the fact-value dichotomy. The unity of science 
assumes that “the logic of scientific inquiry was the same for all fields. Whether natural 
phenomena or social phenomena were the objects of study, the method for acquiring 
valid knowledge and the requirements for explanation and prediction remained the 
same.”"  Thus, it is assumed that the methods of science can be used to study and solve 
the problems of society; problems that are put in terms of quantifiable variables in 
accordance with the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy.
The fourth feature that contributes to the ideological character of positivist theories of 
policy analysis is that in relegating issues of values to decision-maker(s), those who are 
understood as dominant members of the society within a society characterized by 
dominant-submissive social relations, the positivist paradigm “would almost inevitably 
be supportive of those who are dominant.’" ’ These four features, as Fay argues, “Interact
64 Ibid., 61.
"  Ibid.
"  Hawkesworth, 39. 
Fay, 61-62.
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with one another to support the status quo of an industrial society,’"* and thereby 
represent the ideology of the dominant members of a modem industrial society.
Summary
In presenting a summary of the major tenets of the positivist paradigm, we saw how 
the ontological and epistemological tenets are employed to attempt to limit not only the 
problems that are to be considered by the policy analyst, but also the character of the 
solution and the methods of inquiry, to physical objects or those things reducible to 
physical objects. In essence, as noted by Kuhn, these are the effects of a paradigm. 
According to Kuhn, the scientific community acquires from paradigms not only “a 
criterion for choosing problems’, but also rules ‘that limit both the nature of acceptable 
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.”^^
"  Ibid., 62.
Kuhn, 38.
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CHAPTER III
THEORIES OF THE HERMENEUTIC 
CRITIQUE
In response to the criticisms of positivist theories of policy analysis, theorists and 
practitioners formulated theories that are thought to address the shortcomings of positivist 
theories of policy analysis. These theories have been identified by most theorists and 
practitioners as postpositivist theories of policy analysis. According to Morçôl, “There 
are several theoretieal streams [within postpositivism], some of which do not even use the 
title postpositivism.'"^ He has identified these theoretical streams according to the 
following categories: “contextuality and presupposition theories, hermeneutic critique, 
problem structuring and issue framing theories, methodological critique, and 
participatory policy analysis.”  ^ He goes on to note that, “Arguably, among these theory 
streams, the hermeneutic critique presents the most coherent perspective.”  ^ For this 
reason, this chapter and this thesis as a whole, will focus on theories of the hermeneutic 
critique. Specifically, this chapter will focus on summarizing three specific theories
' Morçôl, 104.
^Ibid.
 ^Ibid. These theories have been named for their use of hermeneutic methods.
As Morçôl notes, the “There is a series of commonly held postpositivist 
epistemological assumptions that are espoused in the policy analysis literature, but there
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representing the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique. As Morçôl explains 
regarding his eategory of the hermeneutic critique, “There are three distinguishable, but 
overlapping, theoretical perspectives within the hermeneutic critique: 
phenomenological/interpretive theory, discourse theory, and critical theory.”  ^ As a 
representative of the phenomenological/interpretive perspective, this chapter will present 
a summary of Dvora Yanow’s interpretive theory. As a representative of the discourse 
perspective, this chapter will present a summary of Deborah Stone’s theory of poliey 
analysis as craft, and as a representative of the critical perspective, this chapter will 
present a summary of Frank Fischer’s discursive theory.^ It is important to note here that 
although all three theories are distinct in several ways, they can be understood as sharing 
a similar paradigm—the general postpositivist paradigm.
The method of presenting a summary of each of these theories is to explicate each 
theory in terms of ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets. In doing so, 
this chapter is meant not only to provide a starting point for the discussion in Chapter IV,
is also considerable theoretical variation among post positivist theories” (Ibid., 104).
This indeed makes mapping the geography of postpositivist theories very difficult. Yet, 
Morçôl provides a taxonomy of these theories, and this is the taxonomy that is used by 
this thesis.
 ^ Ibid., 106.
 ^Fischer describes his framework as postempirieist. As Fischer notes in Reframing 
Policy Analysis, ‘postempiricism’ and ‘postpositivism’ are terms defined differently by 
various scholars, “[But] in [his] introductory chapter they should be read to refer 
generally to the search for an epistemology (or theory of knowledge) and a methodology 
that transcends the narrow focus on ‘objective’ empirical research that has been the goal 
of a ‘value-free’ positivist social science” (Fischer, 12, footnote # 10). According to this 
definition of postempiricism, Yanow’s theory and Stone’s theory can also be 
characterized as postempirieist, thus this paper will refer speeifically to Fischer’s theory 
as a discursive theory in order to maintain the conceptual distinction between the three 
theories.
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wherein strengths and weaknesses of how these theories address the shortcomings of 
positivist theories of policy analysis will be discussed, but also to introduce the reader to 
the foundational pillars for an alternative paradigm that is being offered, while the 
positivist paradigm for policy analysis is being rejected.
Interpretive/Phenomenological Theory:
Dvora Yanow’s Interpretive Theory 
In Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis,’ Yanow provides what has been 
identified by Morçôl as an interpretive/phenomenological theory of policy analysis. 
Yanow’s theory focuses on the importance of interpretation to the policy making process. 
Although Yanow does not specifically deny the importance or need for quantitative 
methods of policy analysis, through her theory, she addresses the eritieism that positivist 
theories of policy analysis are impoverished because they fail to take into account the 
importance and place of value claims, which entail values, interpretations, and meanings 
within the process of policy analysis.
As mentioned earlier, positivist theories of policy analysis consider values, goals, and 
problems as given by the deci sion-maker(s) and are believed to be redueible to 
quantifiable measurements of physical objects. Thus, positivist theories of policy 
analysis see no need to address the notion of multiple interpretations of these elements of 
policy within the process of analysis. Yanow, on the other hand, views policy analysis as
 ^Dvora Yanow, Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis, vol. 47, Qualitative 
Research Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). Reprinted 
with permission by Sage Publications, Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis © 2000 
by Yanow. Also, used with permission of author, California State University, Hayward, 
Department of Public Administration, Carlos Bee Blvd., Hayward, CA 94542-3040.
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a meaning making process in which multiple interpretations of values, goals, problems, 
and means must be addressed. As Yanow notes, “As living requires sensemaking, [and] 
sensemaking entails interpretations, so too does policy analysis.”*
1. Ontology
Ontologically, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm denies the positivist’s ontological tenet 
of the fact-value dichotomy. Although Yanow assumes that there are in general two 
categories of things: physical objects and value claims; yet she denies that only physical 
objects can yield knowledge. According to Yanow, value claims can also yield 
knowledge. Thus, Yanow also denies the positivist's distinction that physical objects are 
the sole appropriate objects for inquiry, and that value claims are not appropriate objects 
for inquiry.
According to Yanow’s theory, cultural objects can be further divided into two 
subeategories: human artifacts and communities of meaning. From human artifacts and 
communities of meaning, one can derive value claims that can yield knowledge. As 
Yanow explains, “human meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings are embodied in and 
transmitted through the artifacts of human creation, such as language, dress, patterns of 
action and interaction, written texts, sculpture.”  ^ And as Yanow continues, according to 
hermeneutics, “Human meaning [is] projected into the full range of human artifacts 
(language, music, art, literature, architecture, aets and interactions, physical objects, and 
so on) by their creators, and these artifacts could be studied to gain knowledge of those 
meanings using the same analytic methods that had been developed to understand biblieal
* Ibid., 5. 
 ^Ibid. 8.
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texts.”'** In addition, according to Yanow, various communities of meaning hold various 
interpretations, meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings, and these communities of 
meaning can be studied with hermeneutic methods to reveal the various interpretations, 
meanings, values, beliefs, and feelings that they hold. Thus, according to Yanow’s 
interpretive theory, cultural objects (human artifacts and communities of meaning) can be 
studied to yield value claims—interpretations, meanings and values—that can yield 
knowledge.
According to Yanow, there are “at least three communities of meaning in any policy
situation: policymakers, implementing agency personnel, and affected citizens or
clients.”"  Yet, as Yanow notes, identifying communities of meaning may be more
complicated than simply identifying these three communities, for:
We know from implementation and organizational studies that agencies may 
contain any number of internal communities of meaning: directors, managers or 
administrators, groups of professionals, lower-level employees, and street level 
bureaucrats. And from community studies we know that communities and 
neighborhood have internal divisions.... Moreover, there are many other policy­
relevant groups—community residents, cognate and competing agencies and 
professionals, interest groups, potential clients, unheard or silent voices; which 
ones are of analytic and decision-making concern will depend on the specific 
policy issue in question—each one of which may interpret the policy differently 
from legislators’ intent (if that can even be established as a single meaning).'^
As we will see later on, identifying these communities of meaning comprises one of the
first two steps in conducting an interpretive policy analysis.
'** Ibid., 6-7.
"  Ibid., 10. These ‘communities of meanings’ are also been referred to as 
stakeholders in various policy analysis literature.
Ibid., 10-11.
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2. Epistemology
a) Denial of Epistemological Tenet
of the Fact-Value Dichotomy
Epistemologically, Yanow denies the positivist’s epistemological tenet of the fact-
value dichotomy. By denying the distinctions between positivist’s characterizations of
physical objects and value claims as knowable and not knowable respectively, Yanow
denies that only physical objects can yield knowledge. Her theory as a whole stands as a
testimonial to the notion that value claims can also yield knowledge. Thus, the denial of
the epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy leads Yanow to consider not only
physical objects, but also value claims—which entail interpretations, meanings, and
values—as appropriate objects of inquiry.
b) Characteristics of Knowledge
In addition, Yanow’s interpretive theory holds that differing communities of meaning
can associate different interpretations, meanings, values, and feelings to both physical
objects and value claims. These communities of meaning suggest the epistemological
tenet that value claims are socially constructed. Given the constructivist epistemological
assumption regarding how we come to know the world around us, and how we come to
communicate with each other, Yanow explains how this process of coming to know the
world, and coming to understand those within it, leads to the creation of communities of
meaning. As Yanow explains:
Through a process of interaetion, members of a community—whether a 
community of scientists or environmentalists or some other group— come to use 
the same or similar cognitive mechanisms, engage in the same or similar acts, and 
use the same or similar language to talk about thought and action. Group 
processes reinforce these, often promoting internal cohesion as an identity marker 
with respect to other communities...Such communities may be fluid, ehanging
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from issue to issue (although often with some overlap, e.g., according to positions 
along a spectrum of political or religious ideology).'
This tenet entails that the knowledge is a construct; a construct that reflects a certain 
framework in which policy issues are interpreted, “an interpretive framework within 
which policy-related artifacts makes sense.” '^ Here Yanow argues that various 
interpretations of a policy artifact, event, or situation, held by the various communities of 
meaning, imply a certain framework that makes sense of the various interpretations. As 
Yanow explains, “A ‘frame’—with its metaphoric origins in a picture frame, the 
photographer’s framing of a scene through the view finder, the skeletal frame of a house 
under construction—sets up an interpretive framework within which policy-related 
artifacts make sense. ” ' ^
These frames not only make sense of the various interpretations held by the various 
communities of meaning, but they also “direct attention toward some elements [of a 
policy issue] while simultaneously diverting attention from other elements,” they “entail 
courses of action” and they “are often expressed through language.” As we will see, 
revealing the underlying framework of the interpretations of a policy artifact, event, or 
situation, which involves the explication of various meanings and values held by the 
various communities of meaning, in general beeomes a major task of Yanow’s 
interpretive analysis. As Yanow notes, “The central question, then, for interpretive
'3 Ibid., 7-8
Ibid., 11. 
Ibid.
Ibid.; Ibid., 12; Ibid., 11-12.
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policy analysts is, How is the policy issue being framed by the various parties to the 
debate [the various communities of meaning significant to the policy issue].”'  ^ Thus,
“the role of the interpretive policy analyst is to map the ‘architecture’ of debate relative to 
the policy issue under investigation, by identifying the language and its entailments 
(understandings, actions, meanings) used by different interpretive communities in their 
framing of the issue.”’* Not only does revealing the underlying framework lead to 
understanding the meanings, values, beliefs, and emotions of the various communities of 
meaning, it also leads to understanding the conflicts between the various communities of
19meaning.
In addition, Yanow’s theory of policy analysis assumes that knowledge has a 
contextual nature, and is subject to change and is not universally held. As Yanow notes 
regarding the knowledge derived from language, objects, and acts, “It is important to 
emphasize the contextual nature of such knowledge. Although symbolic meanings need 
not necessarily be ‘local’ meanings in a geographic sense, they are ‘local’ in a policy 
issue sense. It is also important to note that knowledge it is only provisional knowledge, 
subject to change as circumstances and individuals change or as our (mis)interpretations 
are corrected, this lack of universality and eternity stands in marked contrast to positivist 
notions of the certainty of knowledge.” *^*
"  Ibid.
18 Ibid., 12-13.
As we will see later on, Yanow’s notion of frame is equivalent to Stone’s notion of 
ideas, and Fischer’s notion of ideology.
Ibid., 17.
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It is important to note here that although Yanow holds that knowledge is 
characterized by its contextual nature, is subject to change, and is not universally held, 
she also holds that the knowledge gained by policy analysts can be objective, in regard to 
the truth of the statement, when the knowledge claim is about the second-level 
interpretation of interpretations made by the policy analyst within his or her report. In 
other words, the analyst’s interpretation of the interpretations held by the various 
communities of meaning may be determined to be objectively true or false, based on how 
accurately the analyst’s interpretations actually reflect the interpretations held by the 
communities of meaning.
c) Tenet of Quasi-Causal Model 
of Explanation
A fourth epistemological tenet of Yanow’s interpretive paradigm is that knowledge of 
a social phenomenon is centered around deriving knowledge from value claims; from the 
intentions, desires, emotions, values, and meanings of the actors associated with that 
event. This tenet focuses on the relevance of a quasi-causal model of explanation.
Instead of providing an explanation of social phenomenon in the deductive-nomological 
form or the form of probabilistic law, where a certain quantifiable variable is correlated 
with another quantifiable variable by virtue of a general law, the interpretive paradigm 
assumes that the correlation between two variables, in regard to a social phenomenon, is a 
result of the interpretations, meanings, values, and intentions of those involved in the act, 
and in interpreting the act as something meaningful.^’
Fay provides an extensive analysis and explanation of the scientific causal model of 
explanation and the interpretive quasi-causal model of explanation (Fay, 21-85 passim). 
Fay refers to the general law of nature in scientific causal explanations and the desires,
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In Yanow’s paradigm, the tenet regarding the quasi-causal model of explanation is 
apparent in her discussion of narrative analysis; one of the primary methods of inquiry 
used by interpretive theories. She explains how “narratives relate things that are 
understood to have happened.”^^  By relating things that are understood to have 
happened, the beliefs and values held by the narrator, and the meanings one associates 
with the event or the artifacts of that event are revealed, thus allowing for an explanation 
that makes use of interpretations and meanings; an explanation that is not in the mode of 
scientific causal explanations.
As Yanow notes, “An interpretive approach to policy analysis, then, is one that 
focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and 
on the process by which those meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various 
a ud i e n c e s . T h u s ,  Yanow’s interpretive paradigm primarily focuses on discovering the 
quasi-eausal explanations of social events, while also allowing for the discovery of 
scientific causal explanations. This focus is reflected in Yanow’s methodological focus 
of understanding the meanings and values behind the rationale for actions that constitute 
social events and produce human artifacts. Thus, according to Yanow’s interpretive 
theory of policy analysis, although knowledge of physical objects and value claims are 
both relevant to the analysis of policy, Yanow holds that one of the main objeetives of 
inquiry is to discover the value claims that can yield knowledge.
beliefs, and expectations of the actors in quasi-causal accounts as causal mechanisms. 
Fischer also provides an analysis and explanation of these two models of explanation in 
Reframing Public Policy (Fischer, 157-59).
Yanow, 58.
Ibid., 14.
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This is significantly different from scientific modes of explanation that positivist 
theories of policy analysis rely upon. Scientifie modes of explanation only provide an 
explanation of how one variable may be correlated to another variable, and from this they 
assume that the mechanisms that correlate these variables are universal laws. This also 
leads positivist theories of policy analysis to assume a deterministic conception of people 
ruled by universal laws, and leads them to hope for the possibility of social control or 
engineering in which variables are manipulated to bring about a certain desired end.
Quasi-causal explanations do not assume that universal laws can explain correlations 
among variables. Instead, they provide explanations rooted in various interpretations, 
meanings, values, and feelings that are associated with these variables. In this sense, the 
actions of people are not determined by social laws, but more so by their beliefs. Thus, 
although social engineering may still be possible, the possibility is not rooted in the 
manipulation of physical objects, but more so, in the manipulation of value claims— 
which entail various values, interpretations, meanings, and feelings—that are associated 
with these variables.
3. Methodology
a) Denial of the Positivist’s Tenet 
of the Unity of Science 
Entailed by her ontological and epistemological tenets, Yanow provides several 
methodological tenets that eomprise a method for what she refers to as an interpretive 
theory of policy analysis; a method for acquiring propositions of knowledge that are 
rooted in value claims, and are derived from both physical objects—mainly human
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artifacts—and value claims that entail various values, interpretations, and meanings that
are held by various communities of meaning.
Given the distinctiveness of Yanow’s interpretive paradigm from those of the
positivist paradigm, the first methodological tenet held by her theory is the denial of the
positivist’s tenet of the unity of seience. As the whole of Yanow’s methodology argues,
it is false to claim that the logie of scientific inquiry based on natural science applies
universally to all fields regardless of the object in question; that the scientific method of
inquiry is applicable in the study of physical objects that are natural, as well as cultural
objects, such as human artifacts and communities of meaning, and value claims through
the reduction of cultural objects to their physical components, or the reduction of value
claims to variables that can be quantitatively measured.
b) Tenet of Situated Knower
Second, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm holds that policy analysts, like communities
of meaning, are situated knower s. As Yanow notes regarding her interpretive theory of
policy analysis, it is assumed that:
it is not possible for an analyst to stand outside of the policy issue being studied, 
free of its values and meanings and of the analyst’s own values, beliefs, and 
feelings. The argument assumes that knowledge is acquired through 
interpretation, which necessarily is ‘subjective’: it reflects the education, 
experience, training, as well as the individual, familial, and communal 
background, of the ‘subject’ making the analysis. Not only analysts, but also all 
actors in a policy situation (as with other aspects of the social world), interpret 
issue data as they seek to make sense of the policy. '^*
Ibid., 6. As noted by Rudner, the word ‘objective’ “has been used, in fact, to apply 
to at least four different things: (1) the verisimilitude of ideas, i.e., the replicalike 
character of mental imagery, (2) the truth of statements, (3) the reliability of 
methodologies, and (4) the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or 
believe, or employ the kinds of ideas, statements, or methodologies mentioned under 1, 2, 
or 3” (Rudner, 40-41). These various distinctive referents to the word ‘objeetive’ is also 
applicable to its polar opposite ‘subjective.’ Yanow’s use of the word ‘subjeetive’ refers
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The implication of Yanow’s tenet that all policy analysts are situated knowers is that 
no matter how careful an analyst may believe he or she is being in presenting an objective 
or detached analysis of a particular policy and/or policy situation, he or she will not be 
able to provide a completely detaehed analysis; the analysis will always be embedded 
within the analyst’s own values, beliefs, and feelings.
Methodologically, this tenet helps the analyst keep in mind not only the nature of the 
process of analysis but also that of the final product. It implies various levels of 
interpretation regarding the analysis of policy, and the reading of the analysis: the first- 
level interpretation, the second-level interpretation of interpretations made by the policy 
analyst within his or her report, and the third-level interpretation of the interpretations 
made by the reader of the analyst’s reports.^^
e) Mapping Architecture of Policy Discourse
(1) Steps I and II: Identifying Communities of 
Meanings and Artifacts 
Third, the interpretive method holds that the first “role of the policy analyst is to map 
the ‘architecture’ of debate that is relevant to the policy issue under investigation by 
identifying the language and its entailments (understandings, actions, meanings) used by 
different interpretive communities in their framing of the issue.”^^  The mapping of the 
architecture of the policy relevant issue is done in several steps, and each of these steps
to the psychological disposition of an investigator to have or believe, or employ the kinds 
of ideas, statements, or methodologies under 1, 2, or 3.
Yanow, 18.
Ibid., 12-13.
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constitute the steps of the interpretive method of policy analysis. As Yanow explains, 
“The first two steps in interpretive policy analysis are to identify the artifaets that are 
significant carriers of meaning for the interpretive communities relative to a given policy 
issue, and to identify those communities relevant to the policy issue that create or 
interpret these artifacts and m e a n i n g s . T h i s  amounts to the identification of the 
relevant cultural objects, such as human artifacts and communities of meaning, in regards 
to the policy issue.
According to Yanow, these two steps of identifying artifacts and communities of 
meaning are carried out by: (1) conducting interviews with individuals belonging to the 
communities of meaning, (2) observing the communities of meaning, and (3) analyzing 
documents or human artifacts produced by communities of meaning that are relevant to 
the policy issue.^* As Yanow notes, “When used together, these three methods are often 
referred to as participant observation or ethnography.”^^
In addition, it is important to note here that identifying the various communities of 
meaning, and the various artifacts of meaning, is focused around accessing local 
knowledge. This is an important aspect of interpretive analysis, for it brings to the 
forefront the epistemological tenet of multiple perspectives or multiple ways of knowing. 
As Yanow states, “interpretive analysts develop and practice an expertise in the 
methodical process of accessing local knowledge and mapping the arehitecture of policy
Ibid., 20.
28 Ibid., 31.
Ibid.
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debates, but they treat policy, agency, and community members—the actors in the 
situation—as the substantive experts of their own domain.” *^*
By doing so, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm also undermines the traditional positivist 
notion of the analyst as a privileged knower, or technical expert in a scientific sense, and 
provides for a greater understanding of the policy situation—an understanding of poliey 
situations from various perspectives that entail various interpretations, meanings, values, 
and feelings. Thus, Yanow’s interpretive paradigm provides a more democratic process 
of poliey analysis compared to traditional positivist theories of policy analysis. As 
Yanow notes:
This approach is more democratic than traditional policy analytic 
approaches.. .in two senses. Interpretive analysis depends on the poliey analyst’s 
skills as a translator-story teller, not as a technocratic expert, thereby opening up 
the conversation to ‘lay’ people (who are often the ones affected by the policy 
issue) and short-circuiting the contemporary societal value placed on science and 
its technical language. It is also democratic in that it relies on the presence of 
multiple stories, told from the points of view, ideally, all policy-relevant actors, 
and not only on the stories (and thereby values) of experts, policymakers, or other 
elites.^’
It is also important to note here that although Yanow’s theory does not assume a 
traditional positivist notion of a privileged, technocratic policy analyst trained in the 
methods of scientific inquiry, her theory does assume a certain kind of policy analyst who 
is a privileged expert -  in listening and in interpreting. By understanding the interpretive 
policy analyst as an expert translator-storyteller trained in hermeneutic techniques gives 
the analyst a privileged position above their subjects of inquiry. Yet, because her method 
does entail the duty of the analyst to map, as accurately as possible the various voices
Ibid., 19.
31 Ibid., 91.
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within a policy issue, her theory still presents a more democratic process of decision­
making.
(2) Step III: Explicating Interpretations, Meanings 
and Values
The third step in mapping the architecture of the relevant policy issue is “to identify 
the communities’ ‘discourses’: how they talk and act with respect to the issue. The goal 
of this step is to be able to say something about the meanings—the values, beliefs, 
feelings—that are important to each policy relevant community, as well as to extend the 
analysis of the a r t i f a c t s . T h i s  task in specifically oriented towards discovering 
prepositional statements of knowledge that are rooted in value claims that entail various 
values, interpretations, and meanings associated with cultural objects.
In mapping the policy-relevant communities’ discourses, the analyst “identif[ies] the 
‘discourse’: the specific meanings being communicated through specific artifacts and 
their entailments (in thought, speech, and act)” and then “identif[ies] the points of 
conflict and their conceptual sources (affective, cognitive, and/or moral) that reflect 
different interpretations by different communities.”^^  According to Yanow, the 
identification of the discourse is done through the analysis of symbolic language, 
metaphor analysis, category analysis, narrative analysis, the analysis of symbolic objects 
such as built spaces and their ‘props’ and documents, and the analysis of symbolic acts, 
such as rituals and myths.
Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 22, Table 1.1.
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(3) Step IV: Intervention 
A possible second role of the analyst, and a possible fourth step, of Yanow’s 
interpretive method for policy analysis constitutes what she refers to as intervention; but 
as she notes, this role need not be undertaken by an interpretive analyst, for a researcher 
might stop before this point. '^* However, if the analyst chooses to take on this role and 
proceed with intervention, Yanow identifies three ways of doing so. The analyst may (1) 
“show implications of different meanings/interpretations for policy formulations and/or 
action,” (2) “show that differences [or conflicts in meaning] reflect different ways of 
seeing [epistemological and ethical differences],” or (3) “negotiate/mediate/intervene in 
some other form to bridge differences (e.g., suggest reformulation or reframing [of policy 
issues].
d) Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis 
These final possible steps of interpretive policy analysis, and the status of their 
necessity, imply a final methodological tenet of interpretive policy analysis—a tenet 
regarding the role of the policy analyst and the definition of policy analysis. Traditional 
positivist policy analysis has been generally understood as “choosing the ‘best’ policy 
alternative according to an explicit decision rule.”^^  Thus, the information provided by 
the policy analyst is the decision itself that the decision-maker(s) is to make. In effect, 
the analysis entails a choice for the decision-maker(s).
Ibid., 20.
Ibid. 22, Table 1.1. 
Jenkins-Smith, 11.
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In contrast, the form of advice provided by Yanow’s interpretive analysis does not 
entail a choice for the decision-maker(s). The tenet regarding the role of the analyst for 
the interpretive method is that the analyst is “a translator, bringing other interpretive 
communities’ stories to her employing policymaker, agency, or community group, 
helping each to understand the stories of the others. The task of policy analysis in this 
view is to identify and to explain ‘the diverse dimensions of debate pertinent to particular 
policy questions’ (Hawkesworth, 1988, p.94), enabling a more informed policy 
deliberation and choice.”^^  In this sense, the advice provided by the policy analyst is 
understood not as a recommendation as to a specific course of action, but is instead 
understood as information that enables the decision-maker(s) to deliberate and choose a 
course of action given the information provided by the analysis—in essence the policy 
analysis provides the decision-maker(s) with information that he or she may need to 
make an adequately informed decision.
This conception of policy analysis is markedly different from positivist policy 
analysis’s conception of analysis that is likened to a puzzle, which entails the possibility 
of a solution. Yanow’s theory, on the other hand, assumes that the problems of policy 
analysis are not necessarily puzzles because they do not necessarily entail solutions. 
Although decisions can be made based on the information provided by interpretive 
analysts, these decisions are not solutions; they do not necessarily solve the problems 
presented by the policy issue. The decisions instead are provisional courses of action.
Yanow, 90.
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Discourse Theory: Deborah Stone’s 
Analysis as Craft Theory 
In Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision Making, Stone, like Yanow, offers a 
theory of policy analysis based on tenets regarding the value-ladenness of policy analysis. 
Stone suggests that the terms one uses to define goals, problems, and solutions are 
ambiguous, for they have multiple possible interpretations—interpretations that are 
rooted in different ways people see and interpret the world—and this in effect is what 
characterizes their political and value-laden nature. According to Stone, analysis is not 
only a strategically constructed argument for seeing the world a certain way, but in that it 
is so, it is also a tool for the construction of reality towards a certain end.^* Thus, it 
influences and is influenced by the social construction of reality.
In this sense. Stone’s conception of a policy analyst as one who strategically 
constructs arguments for seeing the world a certain way, is in tune with the conception of 
an analyst as an advocate, for the analyst’s argument supports one perspective, one set of 
interpretations, meanings, and values, among the various perspectives within a poliey 
discourse. As Stone notes, “Sharpening your analytic skills will definitely make you a 
more effective advocate, so the tools [of Policy Paradox^ are meant to help you develop 
both your analyst and your advocate selves.”^^
In addition, according to Stone, she uses the framework of goals, problems, and 
solutions “because it expresses a logic of problem solving that is widespread in the policy 
analysis literature and because it parallels the [positivist] models of rational deeision-
Stone, 11.
Ibid., 385.
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making and the policy-making process.”'*** What becomes apparent is that Stone’s use of 
this specific framework also illustrates that theories of policy analysis that use 
frameworks reflecting traditional positivist models of rational decision-making, such as 
cost-benefit analysis and risk-benefit analysis, fail to recognize the ambiguous -  and thus 
political and value-laden nature -  of each of these three elements. For according to 
Stone, these seemingly straightforward elements of policy analysis contain a myriad of 
political complexities that ensue given the nature of society as a polis,"^  ^ and to deny their 
inherent value-laden and ambiguous nature results in an incoherent theory of policy 
analysis.
1. Ontology
Ontologically, Stone’s paradigm for policy analysis, like Yanow’s, denies the 
ontological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy. She denies that only physical objects are 
the appropriate objects for knowledge. According to Stone, we know all objects through 
categories of thought; categories of thought which are not physical. As she explains:
Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has only continua.
They are intellectual boundaries we put on the world in order to help us 
apprehend it and live in an orderly way. That is the meaning of the phrase ‘social 
construction of reality’ and the school of thought it denotes—not that there is no 
reality apart from social meanings, but that we can know reality only by 
categorizing it, naming it, and giving it meaning.'*^
Thus, unlike Yanow, Stone believes that all knowledge, although some are 
derived from physical objects, can only be knowledge when their value claims are
"** Ibid., 12.
41 The polis is Stone’s reference to an “essential political society” (Ibid., 18).
Ibid., 378.
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explicated, which entail the explication of interpretations, meanings, and values. As 
Stone notes, “facts do not exist independent of interpretive lenses, and they come 
clothed in words and numbers. Even the simple act of naming an object places it in a 
class and suggests that it is like something and unlike others.”'*^ Thus, knowledge 
claims are always only known to us as propositional statements rooted in value claims 
that entail various values, interpretations, and meanings.
Within her theory of poliey analysis. Stone makes three general distinctions 
within the category of thought that are assumed to be important to policy analysis— 
the categories of problems, goals, and solutions. As we shall see later on, she 
provides methods for gaining knowledge, which are rooted in value claims, of each of 
these three categories based on their ambiguous and therefore, value-laden nature.
2. Epistemology
a) Denial of the Epistemological Tenet 
Of the Fact-Value Dichotomy 
Stone, like Yanow, also rejects the epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, 
assuming that the appropriate objects of inquiry for policy analysis are value claims. She 
notes that policy analysis is not concerned with facts (the knowledge gained and 
supported by physical objects), but instead by value claims (the various interpretations, 
meanings, and values) espoused within differing interpretations of goals, problems, and 
solutions that are dependant upon contextual influences of the mind, history, rhetoric, and 
power. As Stone explains, “There are to be sure, objective facts underlying all [policy 
relevant] situations. The fetus could probably be described as consisting of certain kinds
Ibid., 311.
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of tissues, with determinable weight, chemieal composition, and anatomical formation. 
But these kinds of facts are simply not the ones that matter in politics. What people care 
about are interpretations of personhood, shootings, wars, and economies. What 
communities decide about when they make policy is meaning, not matter. And [natural] 
science cannot settle questions of [contemporary political or social] meaning.”'*'*
b) Characteristics of Knowledge 
In addition, like Yanow, Stone holds a constructive notion of knowledge. According 
to Stone, given that soeiety exists as a polis, information or knowledge is dependent on 
interpretation and is an object of strategic manipulation. This tenet points to the tenet, 
like Yanow’s conception of a framework that makes sense of human artifacts, that 
underlining our knowledge is a background of interpretations that make sense of the 
knowledge we have. As Stone notes, “Each idea is an argument, or more accurately a 
collection of arguments in favor of a different way of seeing the world. Every chapter [of 
Policy Paradox^ is devoted to showing how there are multiple understandings of what 
appears to be a single concept, how these understandings are created, and how they are 
manipulated as part of political strategy.”'*^
Also, according to Stone, “Much of what we ‘know’ is what we believe to be true. 
And what we believe about information depends on who tells us (source) and how it is 
presented (the medium, the choice of language, the context).”'*^  Thus, Stone concludes 
not only that knowledge is never complete nor is it ever fully and equally distributed.
'*^  Ibid., 379.
45 Ibid., 11.
'*^  Ibid., 28.
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because the information we base our knowledge upon is never fully complete nor equally 
distributed,'*^ but it is also ‘subjective’ in regard to the truth of statements.'**
c) Tenet of Quasi-Causal Modes 
of Explanation
Finally, although Stone does not refer specifically to quasi-causal modes of 
explanation, her theory as a whole, like Yanow’s, stands as a testimonial to the 
importance of quasi-causal modes of explanation. As we will see in the following 
section, one of Stone’s major methodological tenets is based on the notion of 
deconstructing alternative policy discourses. The act of doing so, according to Stone, is 
focused around explicating the various interpretations of goals, problems, and solutions, 
along with the various value claims, which entail various meanings and values that are 
associated with various interpretations.
One example of this is the act of deconstructing narratives. As Stone explains, 
narratives “provide explanations of how the world works.”'*^  Although narratives 
themselves are quasi-causal explanations, the result of deconstructing narratives is also a 
quasi-causal explanation of why various policy advocates understand the policy problem 
in the way that they do, and why they support one policy alternative in respect to another. 
Thus, Stone’s theory, like Yanow’s, stresses the importance of quasi-causal modes of 
explanation.
'*^  Ibid., 29.
'** Rudner, 40-41.
'*^ Stone, 137.
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3. Methodology 
a) Tenet of Situated Knower 
Stone’s theory of policy analysis, like Yanow’s, also assumes that the subject of 
knowledge is situated within his or her own framework of interpretations, meanings, and 
values. As mentioned above in the section on Stone’s characteristics of knowledge. 
Stone believes that our knowledge is based on ideas that are a collection of arguments on 
how one sees the world. These ideas are the underlying frames for what we know, and as 
Stone continues to explain, much of what we know is based on what we believe to be 
true, and what we believe to be true is based primarily on our sources of information and 
mediums of information. Thus, as subjects of knowledge, we are embedded within a 
framework of ideas, which are gathered from various sources through various mediums 
of exchange. Thus, like Yanow, Stone concludes that the product of analysis also entails 
a framework of meanings, interpretations, and values that must be analyzed, or as Stone 
may put it, deconstructed.
b) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness 
of Goals
Stone holds three major methodological tenets. The first is the tenet that goals, a 
category of thought, are by nature ambiguous and thus, value-laden and political. In 
“Part II” of Policy Paradox, Stone addresses the ambiguous nature of goals in her 
analysis of equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and community ‘goals’. According to 
Stone, the notion of a goal, also referred to as an objective or a value, “conveys the 
central tenet of modem policy analysis—namely, that policy is the rational attempt to
64
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attain objectives,” *^* and they are used not only to justify policy but also as a criterion for 
evaluation.^* As Stone notes, the unifying fact of the treatment of goals in positivist 
theories of policy analysis is that they “search for a single definition or single criterion 
that can offer a determinant rule for justification or evaluation.”^^  However, as she 
argues, “None of these criteria in fact offers a simple or determinant rule. Each of them 
contains ambiguities and problems of interpretation that make them the object of political 
s t r ug g l e s . Th es e  ambiguities are rooted in value claims that entail various 
interpretations, meanings, and values that are associated with the conception of goals.
For example, she explains how the notion of ‘equity’ can carry various meanings.
She notes how the notions of ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ are conceptions of distribution,^'* and 
they contain “three important dimensions: the recipients (who gets something?), the item 
(what is being distributed?), and the process (how is the distribution to be decided and 
carried out?).”^^  As Stone continues, each of these dimensions present challenges to the 
positivist’s conception of a value-neutral policy analysis.
50 Ibid., 37.
Ibid.
Ibid.
53 Ibid.
'^* Stone uses the word ‘equality’ “to denote sameness and to signify the part of a 
distribution that contains uniformity -  uniformity of slices, or of meals, or of voting 
power, for example”, and she uses ‘equity’ “to denote distributions regarded as fair, even 
though they contain both equalities and inequalities” (Ibid., 42). Cf. Aristotle, Ethica 
Nicomachea, Bk V.
55 Ibid.
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The dimension of the recipient presents two challenges. The first is the challenge of 
how one is to define the membership within the class of recipients, and the second is a 
challenge to how society is internally divided, either horizontally or vertically or by 
group. To exemplify the first challenge. Stone offers the notion of citizenship. As 
Stone explains:
On the first thought, one might think a citizen [of the United States] is anyone 
bom on American soil or bom of American parents or legally naturalized. But 
once we think about the different purposes and policies for which we need a 
concept of citizenship, the definition becomes less obvious. When the right to 
vote is at issue, it is often believed that people should meet certain qualifications 
to be considered voting citizens. They should know how to read so that they can 
follow policy debates (literacy test); they should own property so that they ‘have a 
stake in the system’ (property qualification); or they should reside in the 
jurisdiction a certain length of time so that they ‘understand the issue’ (residency 
requirements).^^
The second challenge is exemplified by the two conceptions of equity in the field of 
economics, horizontal and vertical equi ty.Horizontal  equity is defined as “equal 
treatment of people within the same rank” and vertical equity is defined as “unequal 
treatment of people in different ranks.”^^
The second dimension of equity or equality, the dimension of the item, presents 
challenges of defining the item being distributed.^^ These challenges entail defining 
boundaries of the item or defining the item’s value. As Stone illustrates:
56 Ibid., 43.
57 Ibid., 42.
58 Ibid., 43.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 45.
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Student financial aid is an issue involving boundary challenges to the 
definition of the item. A few schools give aid strictly on the basis of students’ 
academic merit. But most distribute aid at least in part on the basis of students’ 
financial need. When a school considers financial need, it is looking at its 
financial aid—what it distributes—not as money in itself but as part of each 
student’s total assets. It then has to decide what to count as a student’s asset.
Some schools look only at the student’s current earnings and savings. Others take 
a more global view and include parents’ earnings and savings. Law, medical, and 
business schools typically consider their students’ high potential future earnings 
as part of their assets, and tend to offer loans rather than outright scholarships, on 
the theory that their students can easily pay back loans out of their future 
earnings. Thus, within the issue of financial aid, we have at least four possible 
definitions of what is being distributed: aid as money itself, aid as part of a 
student’s assets, aid as part of a family’s assets, and aid as part of a student’s 
lifetime earning.^’
The third dimension of equity or equality, the dimension of process, presents 
challenges to the process of obtaining equity or equality. As Stone notes, “Process is 
important because our notion of fairness includes not only the end result but the sense of 
fair process by which the result occurred. Thus, if after hearing testimony in a criminal 
case, the jury flipped a coin to decide whether to convict, we would think the trial unfair 
even if it resulted in a decision we believed was in accord with the evidence. For many 
things in life—such as prize lottery, an election, or an athletic competition—we are quite 
willing to accept unequal results so long as we know that the process is fair.”^^
Thus, in assuming that goals, which are characterized in terms of values such as 
equity, efficiency, security, liberty, and community ‘goals,’ are consistent with a single 
definition or criterion, positivist theories not only deny the possibility of conflicting 
definitions, but in unquestionably accepting these definitions determined by the analyst or 
decision-maker(s), the analyst unquestionably supports a specific conception or
Ibid., 49-50. 
Ibid., 51-52.
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interpretation of these goals. By doing so, the positivist paradigm not only falsely 
assumes that there are no ambiguities in the analysis of policy, but also supports and 
reifies a set of values, interpretations, and meanings associated with only one perspective 
among the various perspectives within the policy discourse.
c) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness 
of Problems
Stone’s second methodological tenet is that the notion of problems, another category 
of thought belonging to the social realm, is inherently ambiguous and political, and thus, 
value-laden and political. In “Part III” of Policy Paradox, Stone addresses the 
ambiguous and political nature of problems in her analysis of the types of language used 
for defining and portraying policy problems. According to Stone, positivist theories of 
policy analysis define a problem as “a statement of a goal and the discrepancy between it 
and the status quo.”^^  However, in her analysis of how symbols and numbers are used, 
and how causes, interests, and decisions are portrayed. Stone explains how “problem 
definition is never simply a matter of defining goals, and measuring our distance from 
them. It is rather the strategic representation of situations. Problem definition is a matter 
of representation because every description of a situation is a portrayal from only one of 
many points of view. Problem definition is strategic because groups, individuals, and 
government agencies deliberately and consciously fashion portrayals to promote their 
favorite course of action.
“  Ibid., 133.
64 Ibid.
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According to Stone, (1) symbols, (2) numbers, (3) causes, (4) interests and (5) 
decisions all represent types of language used in portraying and defining policy problems; 
in creating quasi-causal explanations of problems. All five types of language used in 
portraying and defining problems are dependent upon various values and interpretations 
of meaning, thus they are ambiguous, and so political and value-laden.
As Stone explains about (1) symbols, there are “four aspects of symbolic 
representation [that] are especially important to the definition of problems”: (a) narrative 
stories, (b) synecdoches, (c) metaphors, (d) and ambiguity. As Stone continues to 
explain, (a) narratives “provide explanations of how the world works”; (b) '^’Synecdoches 
are figures of speech in which a part is used to represent a whole”; (c) metaphors is the 
comparison of two things as similar or alike; and {àyAmbiguity, [is] the capacity to have 
multiple meanings”,^  ^as we saw with the examples regarding citizenship and student 
financial aide. All four aspects of symbolic representation denote the ambiguous, and 
thus, value-laden and political nature of symbols.
(1) Numbers, as Stone explains, “is about the language of counting’, and ‘Counting is 
at bottom metaphor-making, because to count requires making judgments about how 
things are like one another in important ways.”^^  Thus, the uses of numbers, in the 
portrayal of problems, reflect various interpretations of how the numbers correlate to 
those things that are being counted.
Ibid., 137. 
Ibid.
Ibid., 134.
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In regards to (3) Causes, Stone notes that, “In the polis, causal stories are 
strategically crafted with symbols and numbers and then asserted by political actors who 
try to make their versions the basis of poliey c h o i c e s . T h u s ,  causes reflect quasi-causal 
explanations rooted in various interpretations of symbols and numbers.
Of (4) interests. Stone explains that, “The sides in politics are said to be ‘interests.’ 
They are groups that have a stake in an issue or are affected by it.. .Interests, in the 
language of politics, are the active side of effects, the result of people experiencing or 
imaging effects and attempting to influence them.”^^  Thus, interests reflect various 
values, interpretations, and meanings that are associated with the various interests held by 
the various stakeholders.
In regard to (5) decisions. Stone explains that:
The hallmark of contemporary [positivist] policy analysis is its focus on rational 
methods of decision making. Problems are cast as a choice between alternative 
means for achieving a goal, and rationality means simply choosing the best means 
to attain a given goal.
In this approach, all policy problems become subspecies of a single meta­
problem: how to make a decision that will attain a given goal. These models of 
decision are prescriptive rather than descriptive or predictive; they define policy 
problems as decisions, and they purport to show the best decision to solve a 
problem.^*^
Thus, decisions also entail various values and interpretations of meaning, not only 
because choosing the ‘best’ means involves one to determine which value to use in order 
to measure which means is the ‘best’, or to provide a hierarchy o f ‘best’ means, but also
Ibid., 189.
69 Ibid., 210.
Ibid., 232.
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because the understanding of the problem for which the decision is to provide a solution, 
also entails various values and interpretations of meaning.
d) Ambiguity and Value-Ladenness 
of Solutions
Stone’s third methodological tenet is that the notion of solutions is also by nature 
ambiguous, and thus, value-laden and political. In “Part IV,” Stone addresses the 
ambiguous nature of solutions, also referred to as policy strategies, or policy instruments. 
As Stone argues, “The means of tackling policy problems are often called policy 
instruments or policy solutions. These terms give the misleading impression that public 
polices create permanent mechanical fixes. Policy actions, though, are ongoing strategies 
for structuring relationships and coordinating behavior to achieve collective purpose.” '^ 
As Stone continues, solutions or policy instruments, are always about the use of power, 
about “getting people to do what they otherwise might not do” either through 
inducements, rules, the portrayal of facts, the use of rights talk, and/or the manipulation 
of power.
As Stone argues throughout this section, the choice and implementation of these 
policy instruments are subject to the struggles of politics, the struggles of a value-laden 
world. Thus, in determining a specific solution as the ‘best,’ positivist theories deny all 
other conceptions of solutions, along with the values that these differing conceptions 
encompass. Not only this, but in unquestionably aecepting the solution recommended by
Ibid., 261. 
Ibid.
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the analyst, one not only accepts a structure of power, but also a specific conception of 
human behavior, structural relationship, and values.
e) Denial of Positivist Tenet 
of Unity of Scienee
Another methodological tenet held by Stone’s theory of policy analysis as craft is the 
tenet regarding a specific definition of policy analysis. This tenet entails the denial of the 
positivist’s tenet of the unity of science. According to Stone, policies contain ideas and 
“Each idea is an argument, or more accurately a collection of arguments in favor of 
different ways of seeing the world. These ideas are arguments that are instrumental in 
the way one interprets and understands the world. In addition, according to Stone, “Ideas 
are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money, 
votes and guns.. .Ideas are at the center of political conflict. Policy making, in turn, is a 
constant struggle over criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the 
definition of ideals that guide the way people behave.” "^* Thus, “policy is centrally about 
classification and differentiation, about how we do and should categorize in a world 
where categories are not given”,^  ^and questions regarding categorization, how to classify 
and what to classify, are not only fundamental struggles of politics, but also, are 
fundamental challenges in policy analysis. Thus, the analysis of policy requires a set of 
tools that are different from the set of tools used in natural science.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid.
75 Ibid., 380.
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f) Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis 
Finally, in this view of policy analysis, the whole of policy analysis entails 
ambiguous notions of values and various interpretations of meaning. Thus, Stone holds 
that policy analysis is a deconstructive act of revealing these various interpretations and 
meanings behind alternative policy perspectives, as well as a constructive act of making 
arguments for one’s own perspective—one’s own interpretations, meanings, and values. 
As Stone puts it, “analysis is itself a creature of politics; it is a strategically crafted 
argument, designed to create ambiguities and paradoxes and to resolve them in a 
particular direction.”^^
As a strategically crafted argument, a policy analysis is meant to advocate a specific 
way of understanding and interpreting the policy situation; the analyst is meant to give 
voice to a specific discourse within the various discourses regarding the specific policy 
issue. As Stone notes in her example of Policy Paradox in action, “I use the tools of 
Policy Paradox to help me think of the issues, analyze and critique the arguments of the 
other side, and argue persuasively for what 1 believe”, “I invite you, readers, to 
deconstruct both positions and to argue on your own for what you believe.”’’ In this 
conception of policy analysis. Stone, like Yanow, does not liken policy analysis to a 
puzzle. The analyst here is not a puzzle solver that offers solutions to the policy 
problems, instead they are political advocates who argue for courses of action that the 
analyst personally believes to be good or right.
Ibid., 8.
77 Ibid., 385; Ibid.
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Also, as Stone notes regarding decision-analysis strategies of problem definition for 
her model of decision-making, the analyst should: (1) “state goals ambiguously and 
possibly keep some goals secret or hidden’; (2) ‘Be prepared to shift goals and redefine 
goals as the political situation dictates’; (3) ‘Keep undesirable alternatives off the agenda 
by not mentioning them’; (4) ‘Make your preferred alternative appear to be the only 
feasible or possible one’; (5) ‘Focus on one part of the causal chain and ignore others that 
would require politically difficult or costly policy actions’; (6) ‘Use rhetorical devices to 
blend alternatives’; (7) ‘Don’t appear to make a clear decision that could trigger strong 
opposition’; (8) ‘Select from the infinite range of consequences only those whose cost 
and benefits will make your preferred course of action look “best”’; and (9) ‘Choose the 
course of action that hurts powerful constituents the least, but portray your decision as 
creating maximal social good for a broad public.”’*
It is apparent from these suggestions, that Stone’s view of policy analysis is focused 
around the analyst’s own perspective and his or her ability to make the strongest 
argument for his or her way of viewing the policy situation. In essence, one of the main 
goals of the policy analyst, in Stone’s perspective, is to shut out through seemingly 
reasoned criticism alternative views to a policy situation in order to advocate the 
analyst’s own views -  in order to get the analyst’s representation of the problem, goal, 
and recommendation for a solution -  accepted as the appropriate analysis for the issue at 
hand. Stone’s theory in the hands of an elite few can be understood as a Machiavellian 
view of policy analysis, and in the hands of the many, can be understood as an adversarial 
view of policy analysis.
78 Ibid., Decision-Analysis Strategies of Problem Definition (Polis Model) 256.
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Critical Theory: Frank Fischer’s 
Discursive Theory
In Evaluating Public Policy and in Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and 
Deliberative Practices Fischer presents what he refers to as a postempiricist theory of 
policy analysis. Yet, it is important to note that the category of postempiricism is a larger 
and more general category that may also include Yanow’s interpretive theory and Stone’s 
theory of analysis as craft.**’ Thus, to maintain the conceptual distinetion among these 
three theories, this thesis refers to Fischer’s theory as a discursive theory of policy 
analysis.
Unlike Yanow’s and Stone’s theories of policy analysis, Fischer’s discursive theory is 
rooted in the notion of integrating empirical and normative methods of inquiry for 
gaining social knowledge. Fischer holds both empirical and normative aspects of policy 
analysis as important to analysis as a whole. As we will see in Fischer’s methodology, he 
attributes each type of inquiry to a specific level of discourse. In his theory, empirical 
analysis is attributed to the first level of Analytic-Technical Discourse;, and normative 
analysis comprises the remaining three levels of Contextual Discourse, Systemic 
Discourse, and Ideological Discourse respectively (see below, pp. 85 ff).
1. Ontology
Fischer’s discursive theory, like Yanow’s and Stone’s, also denies the ontological 
tenet of the fact-value dichotomy. As Fischer explains of his postempiricist paradigm, 
the general paradigm of his theory, “The starting point for a postempiricist discursive
Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1995). 
**^ Postempiricism has been used synonymously with pospositivism.
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alternative to contemporary [positivist] policy inquiry begins with the recognition that the 
human and physical realms are inherently different...Whereas physical objects have no 
intrinsic meaning structures, human actors actively construct their social worlds. They do 
so by assigning meaning to events and actions, both physical and social. Human 
experience, as such, is enveloped in a non-material social, cultural, and personal realm of 
thoughts and meaning.”*' Thus, Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, focuses on the thoughts 
and meaning—what has been referred to as value claims in the sections on Yanow and 
Stone—as the appropriate objects of inquiry for policy analysis. Fischer, like Yanow and 
Stone, also assumes that those thoughts and meanings (value claims), are knowable, and 
are central to the analysis of poliey. As Fischer explains:
This understanding of social reality has profound import for the way we 
approach the study of social and political inquiry. Based on social meaning— 
motives, intentions, goals, purposes, values, and so forth—social action is 
constructed through language and, as such, its analysis has more in common with 
history and literature than with physical science. Rather than seeking proofs 
through formal logic and empirical experimentation, the investigation of social 
action requires the use of metaphoric processes that pull together and connect 
different experiences based on perceived similarities. The meaning of soeial 
experience is assessed in terms of its position in the larger patterns of which it is a 
part, be it a situation, a social system, or an ideology.*’
2. Epistemology
a) Denial of the Epistemological Tenet 
of the Fact-Value Dichotomy 
Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, also denies the epistemological tenets that positivist 
theories o f  p o licy  analysis assum e are entailed by the ontological tenet o f  the fact-value
81 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 48.
*’ Ibid., 49.
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dichotomy. As Fischer notes regarding the epistemological tenet of the fact-value 
dichotomy, what he refers to as the ‘objective-subjective dualism’, “Stressing the 
subjective foundations of social reality, postempiricist scholars seek to overcome the 
objective-subjective dualism imposed by ‘positivist’ or ‘neopositivist’ epistemological 
doctrines.”*’ Thus, like Yanow and Stone, Fischer concludes non-material thoughts and 
meanings (value claims), are appropriate objects of inquiry and can yield knowledge. 
According to Fischer, “ ‘Facts’ are always ‘theory-laden’ and thus rest on interpretations. 
Emphasizing the integration of normative and empirical modes of discourse, 
postempiricist understand the discursive processes of confirmations and falsification as 
complex activities involving a whole network of assumptions, hypotheses, competing 
theories, even research programmes [sic], rather than singular hypotheses subject to 
direct empirical test (Sabia and Wallulis 1983: 15-16).”*'* Thus, the acquisition of 
knowledge entails uncovering the various values, interpretations, and meanings 
associated with facts.
b) Characteristics of Knowledge
In addition, like Yanow and Stone, epistemologically, Fischer’s discursive theory
holds what he refers to as a social constructionist epistemology. As Fischer explains:
Social constructionism refers to the varying ways in which the social realities of 
the world are shaped and perceived (Gergen 1999). Although there are theoretical 
differences among those who call themselves social constructionists, they share a 
common concern for how people assign meaning to the world.
The idea of social constructionism has its origins in the sociology of 
knowledge (Berger and Luckman 1967; Mannheim 1936). Most basically, it is an 
inquiry into the ways objects are seen through different mental structures or world
*’ Ibid., 12.
84 Ibid., 13.
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views, how they are interpreted in different social circumstances and understood 
during different historical periods.*’
Social constructionism, according to Fischer, “starts with the recognition of the 
theoretical ladenness of facts. This interpretive position holds that social reality and 
empirical observations of it only exist in the context of a mental framework (a construct) 
for thinking about them. Social constructs or mental frameworks are grounded in values 
that determine our perceptions of reality.”*^  This tenet regarding a mental framework, 
grounded in value claims, is similar to Yanow’s conception of frameworks that make 
sense of human artifacts, and Stone’s conception of ideas. Yet, unlike Yanow—who 
assumes a distinction between physical objects that are natural and ones that are cultural, 
which leads her to believe that facts can be understood independently of values—Fischer, 
like Stone, assumes that all facts are ultimately value-laden. Facts are always associated 
with value claims that must be explicated in order to be knowledge. Thus, according to 
Fischer, like Stone, facts alone are not propositional statements of knowledge.
Fischer’s discursive paradigm, unlike Yanow and Stone, also holds that knowledge is 
characterized by consensus. As Fischer puts it, knowledge is more a matter of 
“consensually ‘accepted belief than proof or demonstration.”*’ According to Fischer, it 
is only when the multiple perspectives of various understandings or interpretations of a 
physical objects, or non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims), or events come 
together in a dialeetical process and form a consensus that knowledge is established. As
*’ Ibid., 53.
*^  Ibid., 124.
87 Ibid., 131.
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Fischer explains, “Given the perspectival nature of categories through which social and
political phenomena are observed, knowledge of a social object can be better understood
as something that emerges more from discursive interaction—or dialectical clash—of
competing interpretations. Whereas consensus under empiricism is inductively anchored
in the reproduction of objective tests and statistical confirmation, consensus under
postempiricism is approached through the discursive construction of synthesis of
competing views (Danziger 1995).”**
Fischer also notes that knowledge, or the consensual belief established through a
dialectical clash, must be supported, or warranted by other beliefs or judgments, as with
any argument in informal logic. As Fischer explains it, policy analysis:
seeks to bring a wider range of contextually sensitive evidence and arguments to 
bear on the problem or position under investigation. As Hawkesworth (1988) 
explains, the reasons provided in support of alternatives organize evidence, 
marshal data, apply explanatory criteria, address multiple levels of argumentation, 
and employ various strategies of presentation....Through the process of 
deliberation and debate, a consensus emerges among particular researchers 
concerning what would be taken as valid explanation. Although the choice is 
sustained by reasons that can be articulated and advanced as support for the 
inadequacy of alternative interpretations, it is the practical judgment of the 
community of researchers and not the data themselves that establishes the 
accepted explanation [or knowledge].*^
Fischer also assumes what he refers to as a “‘coherence’ theory of reality that 
emphasizes the finite and temporally bounded character of knowledge.” *^* As Fischer 
further explains, “In contrast to the ‘correspondence’ theory, which takes scientific 
concepts to directly correspond to the empirical referents of reality, the coherence theory
Ibid.
*^  Ibid., 134.
90 Ibid., 130.
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addresses the indeterminedness [5zc] of empirical positions.” '^ Although Fischer refers to 
this as a coherence theory of reality, it is more accurately referred to as the eoherence 
theory of truth.
Yet, Fischer’s conception of knowledge is similar to the coherence theory of truth, 
there is some distinction. According to Laurence BonJour, the coherence theory of truth 
is “the view that the nature of truth [or knowledge] or the sole criterion of determining 
truth [or knowledge] is constituted by a relation of coherence between belief (or 
judgment) being assessed and other beliefs (or judgments).” ’^ As BonJour continues to 
explain, “coherence is intended to be a substantially more demanding relation than mere 
consistency, involving such things as inferential or explanatory relations within the 
system of beliefs.” ’^
It may be said that there is coherence involved in Fischer’s conception of knowledge; 
to say that the belief is supported by evidence through inferential reasoning is to say that 
the belief is inferentially established to cohere or interconnect with other beliefs, and 
although the logical outcome may be that these interconnections establish a system of 
beliefs, Fischer supplies no indication that his conception of knowledge must belong to 
one entire coherent system of beliefs. As we will see in the following section on 
methodology, these tenets regarding the character of knowledge have significant 
implications for Fischer’s methods of policy analysis.
91 Ibid.
Laurence BonJour, “Coherence Theory of Truth”, ed. R. Audi, The Cambridge 
Dictionary o f Philosophy, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 153.
Ibid.
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Moreover, Fischer continues to explain that, “as long as there remains the possibility
of further confrontation with other points of view, the construction of a consensus is
never finished or complete.”’*'* Therefore, according to Fischer’s understanding of
knowledge, we are constantly in the process of creating knowledge through the process of
hermeneutic dialectics, and constantly seeking a deeper and wider consensus. Thus, like
Yanow and Stone, he assumes that knowledge always remains a construct and is always
subject to change; it is never complete and is temporal.
c) Tenet of Both Scientific Causal and
Quasi-Causal Modes of Explanation
A third epistemological tenet of Fischer’s theory is that knowledge entails both
scientific causal modes of explanation and quasi-causal modes of explanation. Fischer
notes in the above passage how social constructs or mental frameworks are grounded in
‘subjective’ experiences and understandings of the social and physical realms. This tenet
leads Fischer, unlike Yanow and Stone, to the conclusion that knowledge of an event
entails both scientific causal modes of explanation and quasi-causal modes of
explanation. According to Fischer:
While empiricist social scientists stress the analysis of cause-effect relationships, 
they seldom establish any such relationship. Empirical analysts generally uncover 
statistical correlations between events, but are unable to prove that one eaused the 
other (that is, that A appeared before B and thus made B happen). Statistical 
correlations can show only that two or more variables move together in a 
particular way, but it offers no evidence about causality...
To move beyond the empiricists’ statistical relationships in effort to have a 
closer look at ‘what causes what,’ that is, the ‘causal mechanism’, we have only 
one alternative—namely, interpretive analysis (Linn 1998). Whereas a causal (or 
statistical) relationship tells us which variables are involved, and something about 
the direction in which they move, only a closer qualitative analysis can offer us
94 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 124.
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statements about how and why these variables are connected. Only through 
interpretive methods can we discover the various possible [quasi-causal] 
explanations of what particular actors thought they were doing when they 
engaged in the actions pertinent to causal relationships.”’
Thus, according to Fischer, “The empirical data of neopositivist consensus can be turned
into knowledge only through interpretive interaction with the other perspectives. Only by
examining the data through conflicting frameworks or standpoints can unrecognized and
hidden suppositions that give it meaning be uncovered and exposed.””^  By revealing the
hidden suppositions through quasi-causal modes of explanation, one can more fully
understand the object or the event described by scientific causal modes of explanation.
3. Methodology
a) Denial of Positivist Tenet
Of the Unity of Science
Given his intent on integrating positivist and interpretive methods for policy analysis,
Fischer’s theory, like Yanow’s and Stone’s, denies the positivist’s methodological tenet
of the unity of science. As Fischer explains;
Adamantly rejected is the idea that a unified understanding of science 
methodology can be applicable to all research questions. Underlying this 
commitment is a rejection of the possibility of neutral observational vocabulary 
that can be used to test and conclusively prove or falsity explanatory hypotheses. 
‘Facts’ are always ‘theory-laden’ and thus rest on interpretations.”’
Within this rejection of the positivist’s conception of the unity of science, we can
identify another distinction when comparing Stone’s and Fischer’s theories with
95 Ibid., 158.
Ibid., 131.
97 Ibid,13.
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Yanow’s. Yanow does not assume that the methods of inquiry for physical objects that 
are natural need qualitative methods to yield knowledge, although she maintains that 
knowledge from both the natural sciences and the social sciences are constructs. She 
only maintains that the kind of method for inquiry for policy analysis is different from 
those of the natural sciences. Stone and Fischer, on the other hand, assume that all 
inquiry, including inquiry into the natural science, is value-laden. Thus, Stone’s and 
Fischer’s rejection of the positivist’s conception of the unity of science is underscored by 
their acceptance of a different conception of the unity of science—that all inquiry, 
whether natural or social, entails methods of uncovering values, interpretations, and 
meanings.
b) Tenet of Situated Knower 
One tenet of Fischer’s theory, shared by Yanow and Stone, is that of a situated 
knower. This is the tenet that the subjects of understanding are situated within their own 
mental framework. As Fischer cites, ‘“The human subjects have preselected and 
preinterpreted this world by a series of commonsense constructs which determine their 
behavior, define the goal of their actions [and] the means available—which help them 
find their bearings in their natural and socio-cultural environment and come to grips with 
it’ (Schütz 1962; 5-6).””* According to this passage, the subject of knowledge has a 
preselected and preinterpreted understanding of this world; an understanding based on 
commonsense constructs that form the subject’s mental framework, and this mental 
framework determines their behavior, defines the goals of their actions and the means 
available to them. This preselection and preinterpretation locates the subject within a
98 Ibid., 51, quoting A. Schütz, Collected Papers, vol. 1 (1962); 5-6.
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specific contextual time and place of history and experiences, and is entailed by one’s
ideology. For Fischer, like Yanow and Stone, the implication of a situated knower is that
the frame of reference must be explicated within the process of policy analysis. Fischer
does this throughout his final three levels of policy discourse.
c) Tenet of Hermeneutic Dialectics
Second, Fischer’s theory holds that social “knowledge has to be acquired through a
process of hermeneutic dialectics.’’”” As Fischer continues to explain:
Hermeneutics refers to the interpretive role in the formulation of subjective 
interpretations about reality. Basic to this interpretive process, as Gadamer 
(1976:15) puts it, is an appropriation of ‘the unknown with the known through a 
process of constructive understanding’. Stated simply, we understand things by 
fitting them into patterns of knowledge, events, and actions that we already 
possess, typically in narrative form, or that are at least available to us as members 
of a particular society. Dialectics is a logic that seeks to represent the 
confrontation of subjective interpretations with other interpretations. The goal of 
a dialectical clash among various interpretations is a constructive synthesis that 
leads to a new inter-subjective understanding. Dialectic hermeneutics is a process 
whereby ‘groups must confront and deal with the constructions of others’ in 
pursuit of a.new consensual understanding (Lincoln and Guba 1989:41).
Knowledge for the social constructionist is thus forged through dialectically 
generated consensus.'””
(1) Level of Analytic-Technical Discourse:
Program Verification 
According to Fischer, hermeneutic dialectics is approached through four levels of 
discourse: (1) technical-analytic discourse, (2) contextual discourse, (3) systemic 
discourse, and (4) ideological discourse. The first (1) level of analytic-technical 
discourse occurs through the process of program verification. As Fischer notes, program
”” Ibid., 124.
100 Ibid.
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verification “focuses on the program objectives of a public policy.” ' ”' This level of 
discourse subsumes quantitative methods of inquiry. It is specifically concerned with: (a) 
whether the program proposed by the policy empirically fulfills its predetermined 
objective(s), (b) whether empirical analysis uncovers secondary or unanticipated effeets 
that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s), and (c) whether the program fulfills 
the objective(s) more efficiently than alternative means available.'”’ This process is 
essentially oriented towards gaining facts from physical objects. They involve 
experimental evaluative research,'”’ which “represents the formal application of the 
scientific method to the social action context of public programs”, '”'* or through quasi- 
experimental evaluation.
(a) Experimental Evaluation 
Experimental evaluation research entails: (1) “the specification of one or more 
programmatic objectives as a criterion for analysis’; (2) finding and developing 
‘quantitative indicators that appropriately measure [the programmatic objectives]’; (3) 
determining ‘the appropriate target population and the corresponding sample for the
101 Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 27.
' ”’ Ibid., 28.
' ”’ Fischer notes here that experimental evaluation research is “sometimes referred to 
as ‘evaluation research’ in the policy literature” (Ibid., 28).
' ”'* Ibid., 28-29.
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evaluation’; '”’ and (4) analyzing ‘the data collected after the experiment has been carried 
out.” '””
Concerning the first step of (1) identifying objectives, Fischer notes that, “Ideally, 
such objectives are determined by the legislation that authorizes the program (Sylvia, 
Meier, Gunn, 1991). [Although,] in fact, however, enabling statutes are often rather 
broad and ambiguous, and the specific objectives may be set by program administrators 
rather than legislators.” ' ”’
In regard to the second step of (2) finding or developing indicators that appropriately 
measure the specified objectives, Fischer notes that, “The choice of indicators, the extent 
of their application, and the duration of the research is governed by the purpose of the 
evaluation, the resources available to the evaluator, the time constraints on the 
completion of the research, and the nature of the program under examination.”' ”* He also 
notes that the measurement of these indicators is done through standardized tests, survey 
questionnaires, closed-end interviews, or secondary sources such as complaint files and 
per capita uses of a service.'””
In regard to the third step of (3) determining the target population and the 
corresponding sample, according to Fischer, after the target group and sample has been
'”’ As noted by Fischer, “The target population is defined in terms of the program 
under consideration; the sample is chosen to represent the population (Fitz-Gibbons et al., 
1987)” (Ibid., 29).
106 Ibid., 28-29.
'”’ Ibid., 29.
' ”* Ibid.
109 Ibid.
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determined the evaluator will ideally divide the sample group into two randomly selected 
equivalent groups, one of the groups would be the ‘experimental group’ and the other 
would be the ‘control group’." ” As Fischer notes, the purpose of the control group is to 
“assure that the effeetiveness of the program is measured rather than other extraneous 
variables.” '"
In regards to the fourth step of (4) analyzing the data, Fischer explains that “in the 
language of research methodology, a hypothesis is tested to determine whether the 
program, as an ‘independent variable,’ has an effect on various conditions and factors 
which are constituted as ‘dependant’ variables. If a program is effective, the statistical 
presentation of experimental data should show a positive correlation between the 
program and the experimental group’s responses.”" ’
This final step in experimental research also entails the two concepts of external 
validity and internal validity. These concepts are used as criteria for determining the 
acceptability of the experimental findings."’ “External validity,’ as Fischer explains, 
‘refers to whether the findings of an experiment can be replicated in similar 
circumstances and generalized to a larger population.”' Internal validity, “concerns the 
ways in which an experiment is designed and implemented. To maximize the internal 
validity of an experiment, the researcher must focus on the explicitness of the definition
" ” Ibid., 29-30. 
" 'ib id ., 30.
" ’ Ibid.
" ’ Ibid., 31.
" '‘ Ibid.
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of the research question or hypothesis, and the development of a research procedure that 
provides for early estimates of both immediate and long-range effects. He or she must 
also confront the ever present concern that the study can become contaminated by social 
and technical factors extraneous to the experiment itself, the appropriateness of the 
people selected to participate, and the tests chosen to measure the experiment.”" ’
It is within this final step of analyzing the data collected from the experiment that one 
will find the answers to the first two questions of program verification. Depending on the 
outcome of the test result(s), it is assumed that one would be able to determine whether 
the program does in fact, justified by empirical evidence, fulfill its predetermined 
objective, or in cases where it does not, the empirical analysis may uncover secondary or 
unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s).
(b) Quasi-Experimental Research 
Quasi-experimental research, as Fischer notes, is more often used when evaluating 
public programs, for “it is rarely if ever possible for every aspect of an experiment to be 
carried out under completely controlled conditions. For example, it may be ethically, 
politically, or legally improper to create a control group by denying a service to people. 
Or it may be impractical to use pretest measures for a program that is already in 
operation.”" ” According to Fischer, there are four different forms of quasi-experimental 
designs that are particularly important in quasi-experimental research: (1) ‘true control 
group, posttest only design’, which is used “when a pretest is not available or when it 
would take too much time (Fitz-Gibbon, Morris, and Lindheim, 1987)”; (2) ‘pretest-
" ’ Ibid, 31-32.
116 Ibid., 32-33.
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posttest, non-equivalent control design’, which is used “when the researcher cannot 
randomly assign subjects to the control group”; (3) ‘single group times-series design’, 
which is used “when a control group cannot be established, but the same measures can be 
applied to one group of people or things several times before and several times after the 
program’s implementation”; and (4) ‘pretest-posttest design with no control group’, 
which is used “to examine obvious effects, but without the confidence that the program 
and not an outside variable has influenced results.”" ’
As Fischer notes, these four types of quasi-experimental design all attempt to make 
use of as many elements of experimental evaluation research as possible. Thus, we will 
find many of the four elements of; (1) specifying the one or more programmatic 
objectives as criteria for analysis; (2) finding and developing quantitative indicators that 
appropriately measure the specified objective(s); (3) determining the appropriate target 
population and the corresponding sample for the evaluation; and (4) analyzing the data 
collected after the experiment has been carried out, within quasi-experimental research."* 
Much of the variances among these quasi-experimental research methods and within 
experimental research methods are found in how each quasi-experimental method, due to 
the various difficulties that may arise, treats the finding or development of quantitative 
indicators, and the determination of the target group in its corresponding experimental 
method.
In that they reflect the method of experimental evaluation researeh, the methods of 
quasi-experimental research are assumed to also be able to determine whether a program
117 Ibid., 34; Ibid.; Ibid.; Ibid., 34-35.
"*Ibid., 28.
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fulfills its predetermined objective, or in cases where it does not, the empirical analysis 
may uncover secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined 
objective(s). Although as Fischer notes, “each of these quasi-experimental designs 
introduces a degree of uncertainty about the reliability and validity of the experimental 
findings.”" ” Thus, the degree to which quasi-experimental methods can determine 
whether the program does in fact fulfill its predetermined objective, or may uncover 
secondary or unanticipated effects that offset the program’s predetermined objective(s), is 
more uncertain than what is assumed of experimental research methods.
The final question in program verification, the question of whether the program 
fulfills the objective(s) more efficiently than the alternative means available, is 
determined most often by either cost-benefit analysis or risk-benefit analysis (a variant of 
cost-benefit analysis). As Fischer states, “once an outcome of a program has been 
empirically established, evaluation can further measure it, as a ‘benefit’, against the costs 
that were involved in achieving it.” ' ’” And as Fischer continues, in the method of cost- 
benefit analysis, “the analyst first identifies the monetary costs of the input factors needed 
to accomplish a particular program, then assigns monetary values to the estimated or 
actual outcomes associated with the programs, and finally calculates the efficiency of the 
program as a ratio of costs expended to benefits produced. An efficient program is one in 
which the benefits outweigh the costs; an inefficient program is one in which the costs 
outweigh the benefits.”' ’ '
" ” Ibid., 35.
' ’” Ibid.
' ’ ' Ibid.
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In regards to risk-benefit analysis, Fischer notes, “essentially, risk-benefit analysis is 
‘a type of cost-benefit analysis in which the negative consequences of a project or 
program are measured in terms of the types and magnitudes of risk to individuals or to 
communities instead of in monetary units’ (Sylvia, Meier, Gunn, 1991:60).”’^  ^ As 
Fischer continues, “the methodology of risk-benefit analysis is fundamentally an 
integration of two methodologies: risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.”’^^
In program verification, as we saw within its three focusing questions, and within the 
method of experimental evaluation research, quasi-experimental evaluation, cost-benefit 
analysis, and risk benefit analysis, the process of verification specifies a discourse that 
addresses the use of quantitative measurements in determining whether a policy fulfills 
its specified program objectives.'^'' It is important to note here that Fischer makes a 
distinction between policy objectives and policy goals. Although they may seem one and 
the same, policy objectives are “quantifiable programmatic criteria” derived from broadly 
stated abstract policy goals.
Within Fischer’s methodology, this is only the first level of discourse in which policy 
analysts take part. For Fischer, although program verification may direct inquiry, 
knowledge consists in understanding the meanings and values associated with the object 
of inquiry. Thus, the analyst moves from this point of analysis to discovering the 
meanings and values associated with these objects or events in the second level of
Ibid., 38. 
Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 27.
Ibid.
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discourse -  contextual discourse. By doing so, the analyst shifts from quantitative modes 
of inquiry to interpretive modes of inquiry.
(3) Level of Contextual Discourse:
Situational Validation 
Contextual discourse, for Fischer, constitutes what he refers to as first-order policy 
evaluation .F irst-order policy evaluation is concerned with what Fischer refers to as 
first-order constructs, “the social actor’s constructs.” '^  ^ Thus, the focus of contextual 
discourse, which entails the process of situational validation, is in revealing the constructs 
of the social actors, and results in a first-order explanation. This is similar to what 
Yanow refers to as first-level interpretation of the policy situation experienced by the 
various stakeholders or policy-relevant actors. This is essentially oriented towards 
gaining knowledge of non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims). Similar to 
Yanow’s and Stone’s use of hermeneutic methods, according to Fischer, through case 
studies, observation and interviews, the policy analyst is thought to gain an understanding 
of (1) how various stakeholders may see the various elements of the program verification 
as being relevant or not to the objective at hand, (2) how various stakeholders view the 
situation or the problem and make cases for exceptions, and (3) how various stakeholders 
understand the objeetives to constitute differing criteria. These three elements eonstitute 
understanding the various perspectives of various stakeholders in regards to the 
information arrived at from program verification.
Ibid.
127 Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 51.
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As Fischer notes regarding the proeess of situational validation, “The validation 
phase of policy evaluation is eoncemed with the relevance of poliey objectives employed 
in an evaluative judgment. Whereas verification attempts to show that a program fulfills 
or fails to fulfill an objective, validation asks whether the policy objectives are 
appropriate to the specific problem situation under investigation. To render such an 
assessment, evaluation turns from an emphasis on the empirical rigor of quantitative 
research to normative discourse and the interpretive methods of qualitative analysis.
Fischer continues to explain that the method of situational validation is centered on 
three major questions: (1) “is the program objective(s) relevant to the problem’; (2) ‘are 
there circumstances in the situation that require an exception be made to the objective(s)’; 
and (3) ‘are two or more objectives equally relevant to the problem situation.
According to Fischer, in answering the first question of situational validation, (1) 
whether the program objectives are relevant to the problem under investigation, the 
analyst is to produce an argument, according to the rules of informal logic, that argues 
that the variables selected and measured during the process of program vindication were 
determined according to the objective, and that the objective meets the requirements of 
certain higher goals which have been obtained from expanding the terms of the objectives 
to greater abstraction. As Fischer explains it, “The relevance of a program can be 
established through both an appeal to the facts of the situation and the more general (or 
higher) goal from which the objective at issue has been reduced. The appeal to a higher 
goal is essentially an exercise in logic. It entails a logical demonstration that the
Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 69. 
Ibid., 70.
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objective under investigation actually meets the requirements of the higher criterion. 
According to the principles of normative logic, it is said that the objective falls within the 
range or scope of the higher goal. ..With regard to the facts of the situation, the focus is 
on empirical context from whieh the program variables are selected and measured.”
The second question of situational validation, (2) determining whether there are 
circumstances in the situation that require an exception be made to the objective(s), 
according to Fischer, “must be based on evidence showing that it is better to permit an 
exception to the objective than to fulfill it. A circumstantial exception requires showing 
that the objective under judgment is applied to a situation in which it leads to secondary 
or unexpected consequences that offset—qualify, compromise, or perhaps even negate— 
the beneficial outcomes. Such consequences can result from either conflict between 
competing criteria, specific dimensions of the situation, or both. Basic, then, to such a 
deduction is the empirical description and definition of the particular facts of the 
situation.”'^'
Not only does identifying exeeptions entail the understanding of the empirical 
description and definition of the particular facts of the s itu a tio n ,b u t this question also
Ibid., 73.
131 Ibid., 74.
By ‘empirical description’ or ‘definition’, Fischer understands this to indicate what 
descriptions or definitions were used as empirieally testable variables of the situation or 
event. Thus, Fischer’s notion of empirical definition reflects the integration of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. It considers these definitions to be supported by 
empirical evidence, but it also admits to the notion that descriptions and definitions are 
socially constructed, thus there is a possibility of having competing descriptions or 
definitions that are used as variables for empirical verification. The key to understanding 
this conception of empirical description or definition is that, according to Fischer, if there 
are competing descriptions or definitions, then these are not forms of knowledge,
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“involves determining what constitutes a good reason for inferring conclusions entitled 
by particular circumstances. In particular terms, this involves assembling both the 
arguments for and against specific programmatic objectives and the empirical facts of the 
situation, and subjecting them logical rules or reason. The most basie objective is to 
decide whether or not there is anything about the factual circumstances themselves which 
requires that an exception be made to the applieation or use of the eriterion [determined 
by the objective].” '^ ^
The final question of situational validation, (3) determining whether there are two or 
more objectives equally relevant to the problem situation, occurs “when an aspect of one 
[objective] that is judged to be bad is considered to be good by another [objective].” '^ '* 
This occurs within the process of situational validation primarily when various 
stakeholders view the problem or the objective differently. In this case, according to 
Fischer, “to resolve such conflict, it is necessary to determine which of the objectives 
takes precedence, a process involving a logical appeal to higher-order criteria. Whether 
one or another objective is better is established by ranking them aceording to a higher 
standard or goal. When one objective is determined to take precedence over the others, it 
can be said that the first one is a ‘higher’ claim or establishes a ‘higher obligation.
although they are empirically verifiable. For these descriptions or definitions to be forms 
of knowledge, there must be a universal consensus as to their description or definition.
133 Ibid., 74.
Ibid.
Ibid., 74-75.
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As Fischer notes, there may be no higher level goal or principle that would help in 
resolving the conflict of competing objectives, thus one would be move from the first- 
order evaluation of situational validation to the second-order evaluation of societal 
vindication, which occurs within Fischer’s third level of discourse—systemie 
discourse.Second-order evaluation is concerned with the constructs of social science 
and results in the social scientists’ second-order explanation.'^^ This too is oriented 
towards arriving at knowledge of non-material thoughts and meanings (value claims).
(4) Level of Systemic Discourse:
Societal Vindication
As Fischer goes on to explain, “at the level of policy vindication, the societal system
is the normative frame of reference. A societal system, in this respect, can be broadly
understood as an interdependent set of political, economic, and cultural relationships.
The concept of the ‘system’ is used here to refer to a set of arrangements principally
structured by the state and the economy and governed by power and money (Habermas,
1973).” '^  ^ Given the normative reference of the societal system, the first task of
vindication involves the:
Identification of goals, values, and practices of the institutional arrangements of 
the social system which the policy is designed to influence, facilitate, or change. 
Second, it involves an empirical assessment of the policy’s desired impact on 
these normative processes. The comparison in the evaluation involves the 
adoption and testing of other actual or possible policy goals and assumptions that 
may or may not have instrumental or contributive value for the same social 
system. The basic task is to develop hypotheses about the wider societal impacts
Ibid., 75.
Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 51. 
Ibid., 112-13.
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that would be expected to result from the policy goals and assumptions, and to
test them to see if they occur.
Identifying the goals, values, and praetiees of the societal system and testing the 
policy goals, and alternative policy goals, to determine whether the policy, or alternative 
policy, has an instrumental or contributive value, or is harmful to the societal system, is 
done by using a range of various research methods. The choice of which of these 
methods is used is determined by the policy problem, and the methods that can be 
employed ranges from quantitative methods of empirical data collection methodologies, 
large-scale cross-sectional analyses, cost-benefit data, systems simulation to qualitative 
methods of interviews and case studies.'''*’
These research methods are used not only in determining the effects of the policy, or 
policy alternatives, but they are also employed to gain understanding of the normative 
framework of the society, the goals and values of the society. In determining the 
normative framework of a society, these methods assist specifically in identifying the 
underlying assumptions of the normative framework of society. Some of these 
assumptions are characterized as assumptions regarding;
• The proper scope of market versus governmental activity.
• The proper distribution of power and authority among various levels of 
government; the identification of social and political groups whose welfare is 
considered to be most important.
• The positions of substantive policy conflicts, such as economic development 
versus environmental protection.
• The basic choices concerning policy means, such as inducements, persuasion, 
and coercion.
• The desirability of political participation by various segments of the social 
system: elite versus public participation; experts versus elected officials.
Ibid., 116.
140 Ibid., 117.
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• The perceived ability of soeiety to solve the various substantive problems, for 
example, technologieal optimism versus pessimism.''"
Although these methods may contribute to the final process of determining whether 
policy programs, or policy alternatives, have any instrumental or contributive value to the 
societal system, the determination of whether or not they do is done by the methods of 
determining macro costs and benefits. As with the first two levels of discourse, the 
analyst in the end presents his finding as an argument according to the rules of informal 
logic. In this case, the analyst argues in support of a specific program, or program 
alternative, as one that has the most instrumental or contributive value to the societal 
system. If this claim is further contested on the basis of conflicting conceptions of 
determining macro costs and benefits, the evaluation, according to Fischer, moves form 
the third level of systems discourse to the fourth level of discourse, ideological discourse.
(5) Level of Ideological Discourse:
Social Choice
According to Fischer, “the fourth and final discursive phase of the logic of policy 
deliberation turns to ideological and value questions. Here the informal logic of criteria 
of consistency and transcendent values come into play. Social choice seeks to establish 
and examine the selection of a critical basis for making rationally informed choices about 
societal systems and their respective ways of l i f e . T h i s  process is referred to by 
Fischer as soeial choice, and is also oriented towards arriving at non-material thoughts
Ibid., 113.
Ibid, 195.
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and meanings (value claims). As Fischer eontinues to explain, social choice raises the 
following types of questions:
• Do the fundamental ideals (or ideological principles) that organize the accepted 
social order provide a consistent basis for a legitimate resolution of conflicting 
judgments?
• If the social order is unable to resolve the basic values eonflicts, do other orders 
equitably accommodate the relevant interests and needs that the conflicts 
reflect?
• Do normative reflection and empirical evidence support the justification and 
adoption of alternative principles and values?*''^
These questions, as noted by Fischer, are questions most often dealt with by political 
philosophers rather than the policy analysts.''*'' What the policy analyst, according to 
Fischer, needs to consider in this final discursive level is that the analytic judgments 
made throughout their evaluations, and the evaluations themselves, are framed within a 
specific ideological framework, a framework of “fundamental ideals (or ideological 
principles)” that organize a specific social order.'''^
In explicating this framework, Fischer hopes that the analyst not only understands the 
possibility of bias located within their judgments and within their evaluations, but he also 
hopes that the analyst may come to understand the ideological roots of various conflicting 
interpretations of a poliey situation.'''^ In understanding the various ideological roots of 
different interpretations of the policy situation, it is also hoped that the analyst may 
eventually be able to establish a consensual understanding, or interpretation, of the policy
Ibid. 
'""Ibid., 161. 
'"  ^Ibid., 195.
146 Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 113.
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situation by establishing a eonsensus of certain fundamental normative principles of
.  ^ M7society.
It is important to note here that the characterization of Fischer’s discursive theory as a
representative of critieal theory is rooted in the importance of his final discursive phase of
ideological discourse. Because this level of discourse ehallenges the analyst to reveal the
ideological framework behind the various perspectives within the fourth level of
discourse—revealing with it specific presuppositions regarding society, citizens, and
power—this level of discourse challenges the analyst to conduct a critical analysis of the
interpretations of a policy issue and the various ideologies underlining that policy issue.
c) Defining Purpose of Policy Analysis
Finally, the last methodological tenet of Fischer’s discursive theory of policy analysis
is the tenet regarding the definition of policy analysis. According to Fischer, policy
evaluation is defined as:
The activity of applied social science typically referred to as ‘poliey analysis’ or 
‘policy science.’ (Box 1.1) The field according to William Dunn (1981), is an 
applied endeavor ‘which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to 
produce and transform poliey-relevant information that may be utilized in 
political settings to resolve public problems.’ Designed to supply information 
about complex social and economic problems and to assess the processes through 
which their resolution is pursued, evaluations can focus on policy or program 
outcomes (‘outcome’ or ‘impact’ evaluations), or on the proeesses by which a 
policy or program is formulated and implemented (‘process’ evaluation)...Ideally, 
policy evaluation provides politicians and citizens with intelligent basis for 
discussing and judging conflicting ideas, proposals and outcomes.’"*
Yet Fischer’s theory is not only aimed at providing a framework for discourse, but he
also holds that through his four levels of discourse, consensus may be established and
Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 198. 
’"* Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 2.
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solutions may be agreed upon. He holds that policy analysis needs to employ both 
interpretive and empirical modes of inquiry not only to arrive at an understanding of the 
policy and its many interpretations, but it also attempts to provide a framework for the 
discursive process in which stake-holders can talk about the issues at hand and 
eventually, hopefully, establish a consensus regarding the goals, problems and solutions. 
Thus, Fischer’s theory, unlike Yanow’s and Stone’s, is aimed not only at understanding, 
but also at arriving at a specific solution; a specific choice for the decision-maker(s). In 
this sense, Fischer’s theory, like positivist theories of policy analysis, likens policy 
analysis to a puzzle, which entails the possibility of a solution, although this solution may 
never be reached.
Summary
In this chapter, we have been introdueed to three theories representing the three 
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. All three theories are similar in their 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets, although there are some points 
of departure. The similarities are primarily located within their ontological and 
epistemological tenets opposing the fact-value dichotomy, their tenet of quasi-causal 
explanations, their denial of the positivists’ doetrine of the unity of science, their tenet of 
the situated knower who can affect the outeome of analysis, and their tenet of 
hermeneutic methods of inquiry. These tenets can be identified as the general 
postpositivist paradigm that all three theories use, and can be used to distinguish them 
from positivist theories of policy analysis.
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In addition, like positivist theories of policy analysis, through these paradigmatic 
tenets, the three theories aequire limitations to the kinds of problems that are to be 
considered, and the character of the solutions and the methods of inquiry. Yet, compared 
to the positivist paradigm of policy analysis, these paradigmatie tenets broaden the scope 
of the problems, solutions, and methods for policy analysis. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
one of the major criticisms of positivist paradigm for policy analysis was that the 
limitations it placed on these aspects of policy analysis were too narrow, especially 
because their ontological and epistemological tenets of the faet-value dichotomy limit 
their inquiry to physical objects, or things that are reducible to physical objects. Thus, 
they obviate inquiry into value claims. The three theories representing the three 
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique offer paradigmatic tenets that broaden the scope 
of these aspects of policy analysis when compared to the positivist paradigm. Their 
denial of the positivist’s ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value 
dichotomy lead them to conclude that value claims are not only appropriate for inquiry, 
but that inquiry into value claims is central to policy analysis.
102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV
EVALUATING THEORIES OF 
THE HERMENEUTIC CRITIQUE 
As noted in the previous chapters, theorists and practitioners have proposed 
alternative theories to overcome some of the significant problems associated with 
positivist theories. These alternative theories have been identified in general as 
postpositivist theories or postempiricist theories. Within this general category of 
alternative theories to the general positivist paradigm, Morçôl has identified theories of 
the hermeneutic critique as the most coherent theory stream among postpositivist 
theories. As Morçôl continued to explain, there are three theoretieal perspeetives within 
the hermeneutic critique; the interpretive/phenomenological perspective, the discourse 
perspective, and the critical perspective.
In Chapter III, I presented a general summary of three theories representing each of 
the three perspectives within the hermeneutic critique. Many of the similarities between 
each of the theories lie in their ontological and epistemological tenets, especially the 
denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. They 
also share the methodological tenet regarding the importance of using hermeneutic 
techniques in policy inquiry, and the denial of the positivist tenet of the unity of science. 
The question remains, given these three examples of the three perspectives within the 
hermeneutic critique, how well do they succeed in overcoming the criticisms that face
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positivist theories of policy analysis? Thus, this chapter is centered on the question of 
whether the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique 
are able to overcome the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of 
policy analysis. It focuses on four specific challenges; (1) the challenge of overcoming 
the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge 
of providing a democratic process of decision-making within their method of poliey 
analysis, (3) the challenge of providing a coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the 
challenge of resolving the problem of policy analysis as ideology.
In the broad sense regarding the revolution of the science of policy analysis, this 
question is aimed at determining whether the alternative paradigm used by the three 
theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique is more successful 
than the positivist paradigm in resolving some of the key issues identified by theorists 
and practitioners. As Kuhn noted, “Paradigms gain their status because they are more 
successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners 
has come to recognize as acute.” ' Thus, the question this chapter addresses is also aimed 
at determining whether the alternative general paradigm used by the three theories 
presented is worthy of the status that it is currently gaining.
' Kuhn, 23.
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The Challenge of the Ontologieal and 
Epistemological Tenets of 
the Fact-Value Dichotomy 
As stated in Chapter II, the positivist paradigm of poliey analysis holds the 
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. These tenets 
conclude that there exist two categories of things: physical objects that yield knowledge 
as facts, and value elaims that are meaningless and thus, cannot yield any knowledge. 
They led positivist theories of policy analysis to limit their scope of inquiry to physical 
objects and facts. One reason is that the epistemological tenet of the fact-value 
dichotomy is rooted in the verification criterion of meaning, and according to the 
verification criterion of meaning, those things that are knovvable, and thus have meaning 
or literal significance, are those things that are empirically verifiable through sense 
experience. As A.J Ayer explains, aecording to the verification criterion of meaning, “no 
statement whieh refers to ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense experience 
can possibly have any literal significance.”  ^ Thus, the epistemological tenet of the fact- 
value dichotomy holds that “All knowledge was believed to depend on observation [via 
the five senses], thus any claims, whether theologieal, metaphysical, philosophical, 
ethical, normative, or aesthetic, which were not rooted in empirical observation, were 
rejected as meaningless.”  ^ Therefore, derived from the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, positivist theories of policy analysis attempt to 
circumscribe the activity of policy analysis to those things that are empirically
 ^A.J. Ayer, The Elimination o f Metaphysics, ed. J. Baillie, Contemporary Analytic 
Philosophy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentiee Flail Ine., 1997), 107.
 ^Hawkesworth, 38.
105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
verifiable— supported by data from physical objects or things that are reducible to 
physical objects—while taking value claims that entail various interpretations, meanings, 
and values, and are not supported by empirical evidence as given.
It has been argued that the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value 
dichotomy reflect the positivist’s misconception of the nature of the objects of inquiry for 
policy analysis. As Fay, Yanow, Stone, and Fischer argue, following from their denial of 
the ontological tenet of the faet value-dichotomy, not only can value claims yield 
knowledge, but the use of this knowledge is what is most important to policy analysis. 
They note that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis are also value claims, which are 
necessarily value-laden; they entail interpretations, meanings, and values. The 
epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, rooted in the ontological and 
epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, ignore this inherent value-laden 
element of the objects inquiry for policy analysis; they should not be understood as given.
For the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique, 
the challenge is then to be able to overcome both the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy; to provide a theory of policy analysis that considers 
value claims significant to policy inquiry—a theory that takes note of the value-laden 
nature of the objects of policy analysis—and to provide a method of gaining knowledge 
of the value-laden aspects of the objects of inquiry for policy analysis.
In response to this challenge, Yanow, Stone, and Fiseher propose ontologieal and 
epistemologieal shifts—the denial of both the ontological and epistemological tenets of 
the fact-value dichotomy. This also leads to a methodological shift that incorporates and 
focuses on the use of qualitative methods of policy analysis and the discovery of quasi-
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causal modes of explanation. As a result, Yanow proposes a theory of policy analysis 
that stresses the importance of the kind of knowledge derived from value claims, 
although she does not deny that knowledge ean also be gained from physical objects 
alone, which results in knowledge as facts. For Fischer and Stone, the result is that only 
value claims can produce knowledge. This is because both Fischer and Stone argue that 
facts themselves are always value-laden. Thus, in order to know facts, one must also 
uncover the underlying meanings, interpretations, and values that are associated with 
facts. Thus, Fischer and Stone juxtapose the categories of objects that are knowable and 
not knowable which are presupposed by the positivist’s ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. Instead of presupposing that only facts, which are 
supported by empirical evidence obtained from physical objects or those things reducible 
to physical objects, are knowledge, they assume that only by explicating the value claims 
can one arrive at knowledge. Thus, only value claims (some embedded in physical 
claims) can produce knowledge.
The denial of both the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value 
dichotomy also lead the three theories to assume that assume that knowledge is a 
construct, and this leads them to conclude that it is never complete and is temporal. 
Although Fischer believes in the incompleteness and temporality of knowledge, he also 
assumes that knowledge is characterized by consensus, unlike Yanow and Stone. Thus, 
Fischer concludes that in most cases, when consensus is not established, we are always in 
the process of constructing knowledge—of establishing a consensus. Yanow simply 
concludes that knowledge is provisional, and Stone concludes that knowledge is 
subjective in regard to the truth of the statements.
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Methodologically, the denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact- 
value dichotomy lead all three theories to deny the positivist’s tenet of the unity of 
science. Yanow argues that because value claims can yield knowledge, but of a differing 
kind, the methods used to gain knowledge of physical objects and facts are not applicable 
to gaining knowledge from value claims. Fischer and Stone, on the other hand, argue that 
although both quantitative and qualitative methods are useful, knowledge is actually 
derived from qualitative methods, since they argue that facts must undergo qualitative 
analysis in order to produce knowledge. Thus, all three theories offer methods for 
gaining knowledge of value claims that are focused around discovering various 
interpretations, meanings, and values. However, for Fischer and Stone, these are the only 
methods that produce knowledge. Most often, these methods are referred to as 
hermeneutic methods, and the result is a quasi-causal understanding of social or natural 
phenomena.
Methodologically, all three theories also foeus on the importance of quasi-causal 
modes of explanation. Yanow argues that discovering the quasi-causal explanations held 
by various communities of meaning is the main objective for policy analysis. To map out 
the various discourses within a specific policy situation is to provide the quasi-causal 
explanations held by differing communities of meaning. For Stone, quasi-causal 
explanations are objects of deconstruction. A major step in policy analysis for Stone is 
the task of deconstructing the various quasi-causal explanations embedded within the 
competing policy perspectives. For Fischer, quasi-causal explanations play significant 
roles within his second and fourth levels of discourse—contextual discourse and 
ideologieal diseourse respectively. In contextual discourse, the objective is to provide a
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micro quasi-causal explanation of the knowledge gained from technical-analytic 
discourse, whereas in ideological discourse, the objective is to provide a macro quasi- 
causal explanation of the conclusions drawn from systemic discourse.
At first glance, these solutions to the challenge of the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy seem obvious. If the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, which lead to the positivist tenet of the unity of 
science and the focus on deductive-npmological explanations or explanations of 
probabilistic law, are problematic, then why remain committed to them? If the criticism 
is that positivist theories fail to give due weight to the methodological importance of 
meanings, interpretations, and values, due to their ontological and epistemological tenets 
of the fact-value dichotomy, which leads them to their methodological tenets, then it 
makes sense to offer as a solution alternative theories founded upon a paradigm that 
denies the ontological and epistemological tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, denies the 
positivist tenet of the unity of scienee, and uses alternative methods of inquiry and modes 
of explanation. By doing so, the three theories successfully bring to the forefront those 
issues that positivist theories have been criticized as obviating. The explications of value 
claims become important aspects of each of the three theories. This effectively broadens 
the scope of inquiry for policy analysis and allows not only for inquiry into value elaims, 
but also focuses policy analysis towards such inquiry.
Yet, questions remain regarding the further implications of the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological shifts made by the three theories representing the 
three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. The criticism that positivist theories of 
policy analysis fail to recognize value claims as knowable and thus, important to analysis.
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is not only about their inability to recognize this claim as legitimate, but it also points to 
the importance of the knowledge gained from value claims to the process of policy 
analysis, especially within the process of decision-making. Thus, given that the three 
theories representing the three perspective of the hermeneutic critique are able to meet 
the challenge of providing a theory that stresses the importance that value claims are able 
to yield knowledge of a certain kind, and provides for an alternative method of inquiry 
and mode of explanation that are tailored to the kind of knowledge gained from value 
claims, how is it that they apply this knowledge to the decision-making process of policy 
analysis? How is it that they realize the importance of the kind of knowledge gained 
from value claims?
The Challenge of Providing a Democratic 
Process of Decision-Making 
Positivist theories of policy analysis have also been criticized for denying a 
democratic process of decision-making. This is because positivist theories of policy 
analysis understand value claims as given, and so fail to take into consideration the 
various interpretations, meanings, and values that may come into play during the analysis 
of policy. Therefore, the conclusion that a specific policy alternative is the ‘best’ is 
undemocratic because it does not allow for alternative interpretations, meanings, and 
values that may be held by relevant communities of meaning or stakeholders. This also 
leads to the conclusion that the decisions arrived at by the positivist policy analyst is ill 
informed, sinee these alternative interpretations, meaning, and values are not taken into 
consideration. Thus, the ontological and epistemological denials of the fact-value
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dichotomy are intimately related to the importance of incorporating a democratic process 
of decision-making. The incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making 
provides the instrumental use of knowledge gained from value claims; the knowledge that 
the epistemological denial of the faet-value dichotomy stresses as being most important 
in the analysis of policy.
This criticism is further associated with notions of democracy, equal participation, 
and the legitimacy of the decision made by policy analysts and decision-maker(s). As 
Fischer notes, “Citizen participation is the cornerstone of the democratic political 
process. The case for democracy derives its basie normative rationale from the prineiple 
that government decisions should reflect the consent of the governed. Citizens in a 
democracy have a right—even obligation—to participate meaningfully in public 
decision-making and to be informed about the bases for government policies.”" The 
positivist’s teehnocratic conception of policy analysis denies citizens their democratic 
right to participate in the decision-making process. In doing so, it leads the public to 
question whether the decisions reflect the consent of the governed.^ In addition, 
according to Fischer, a democratic process of decision-making helps preserve democraey. 
As Fischer notes, “Beyond its essential contribution to democracy per se, citizen 
participation in the policy process can contribute to the legitimization of policy 
development and implementation. Participation, in this respect, can be understood as 
helping to build and preserve present and future decision-making capacities....
Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, 205.
 ^This criticism is of course based on the assumption that democracy is good or 
necessary for a society.
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Discursive participation offers, in particular, the possibility of getting around the 
debilitating effects of interest group competition that often plague liberal pluralism 
(Hiskes 1998).”  ^ Thus, the positivist’s technocratic conception of policy analysis is also 
viewed as being detrimental to a democracy—it illegitimates the decision, the proeess of 
policy development, and the process of implementation as democratic/
Thus, another challenge for the three theories representing the three perspectives of 
the hermeneutic critique, and postpositivist theories in general, is whether they are able to 
provide a theory that incorporates a democratic process of decision-making; a theory that 
appropriately makes use of the knowledge derived from value claims. The three 
criticisms noted above also provide criteria for determining whether a theory is able to 
successfully overcome the challenge of incorporating a democratic process of decision­
making. These criteria ask whether the instrumental use of knowledge gained from value 
elaims: (1) adequately provide for a well-informed decision; (2) reflect the consent of the 
governed, in other words, does it accommodate the right of the citizen to partieipate in 
the decision-making process; and (3) help to legitimize the process of policy development 
and implementation as democratic?
Although the three theories, each to differing extents, attempt to provide for a more 
democratic process of decision-making, in that they take into consideration the various 
value claims that entail various interpretations, meanings, and values that may be 
associated by various communities of meaning or stakeholders, only Fischer’s discourse
*’ Ibid.
 ^The force of this criticism is also based on the assumption that democracy is good or 
necessary for a society.
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theory is able to fully overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process for 
decision-making by fulfilling all three criteria listed above.
Fischer’s theory addresses the importance of inquiry into value claims specifically 
within the last three levels of discourse assumed by his theory. Aecording to Fischer’s 
theory, within the second level of contextual diseourse, through the process of situational 
validation, various interpretations, meanings, and values are taken into consideration in 
order to determine whether the assessment that policy objectives have been met is 
consistent with the various interpretations, meanings, and values held by various 
communities of meaning or stakeholders. Within this process of situational validation, 
there may be an issue of irreconcilable competing objectives or values. In this ease, 
according to Fischer “there is no possibility of resolving the dispute at the level of 
validation. If the parties are committed to pursue the discourse further, they must move 
to the level of vindication.”* It is at this point, where the shift from second level of 
contextual discourse to the third level of systemic discourse, or from the process of 
situational validation to the process of societal vindication, occurs.
According to Fischer, societal vindication “turns to an evaluation of the instrumental 
consequenees of a policy goal and its normative tenets for the extant social system as a 
whole. In the language of polities and policy evaluation, goals and assumptions are 
examined for their contribution to the larger common good, public interest, or general 
social welfare of the society, shorthand normative standards for the social order as a 
w h o l e . T h u s ,  within the third level of systemic discourse, the competing objectives or
Idem, Evaluating Public Policy, 75. 
 ^Ibid., 111-112.
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values that were identified during situational validation are tested against systems- 
oriented beliefs and assumptions.
One problem with societal vindication is that the goals and values of competing 
communities of meaning or stakeholders are evaluated against the normative institutional 
goals and values of the societal system, which are generally held as constant. Because of 
this, the competing objective or goal that questions the legitimacy of the constantly held 
societal norms and assumptions may tend to lose out. Yet, within Fischer’s methods for 
policy analysis, analysis can be taken further into the fourth level of ideological 
discourse, in which those objectives or goals that question the current societal norms, and 
may tend to lose out, can question the ideological foundations of the current societal 
norms. Thus, challenges to the societal norms, which are generally held as constant, are 
addressed within the fourth level of ideological discourse through the process of social 
choice.
Fischer’s fourth level of ideological discourse, the process of social choice, deals with 
the questions of (1) whether the fundamental ideals (or ideological principles) that 
organize the accepted social order provide a consistent basis for a legitimate resolution 
for conflicting judgments, (2) whether when the social order is unable to resolve the basic 
value eonflicts, other orders equitably accommodate the relevant interests and needs that 
the conflicts reflect, and (3) whether the normative reflection and empirical evidence 
support the justification and adoption of alternative principles and values.'*’ According to 
Fischer, political philosophers rather than policy analysts and the various community 
members or stakeholders are to address these questions. Yet, during this process of
'*’ Idem, Reframing Public Policy, 195.
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ideological discourse, communities of meaning or stakeholders ean talk about the various 
ideologies provided by political philosophers. They openly diseuss which ideological 
perspective they endorse and the points of conflict between competing ideologieal 
perspectives. Thus, although Fischer’s theory does assume that some person(s) sits in the 
position of a decision-maker(s), all the relevant stakeholders or communities of meaning 
share the actual process of decision-making. The result is that, the deeision that decision- 
maker(s) is to make, is the decision that has been consensually decided upon among the 
various stakeholders or communities of meaning. It is specifically because of this that 
Fischer’s theory is able to meet the second and third criteria. In addition, by recognizing, 
within all three levels of discourse, the possibility of alternative interpretations, 
meanings, and values, Fischer’s theory is able to fulfill the first criterion.
Unlike Fischer’s theory, Yanow’s theory falls short of incorporating a democratic 
process of decision-making. The main goal of policy analysis, for Yanow’s theory, is to 
map out the architecture of policy discourse for the decision-maker(s). This entails 
inquiry into the various value claims held by the various communities of meaning 
relevant to the policy issue at hand. By doing so, Yanow’s theory allows each voice or 
policy perspective to be equally heard by the decision-maker(s). Thus, Yanow’s theory 
uses the various value claims that may be associated with various communities of 
meaning in order to provide for a more informed decision.
Yet, Yanow’s theory fails to fulfill the other two criteria for determining whether a 
theory successfully incorporates a democratic process of decision-making. It may be true 
that according to Yanow’s theory, the decision-maker(s) is made aware of the various 
perspectives within a policy discourse, but the decision itself is ultimately left up to the
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decision-maker(s). Because of this, the decision-maker(s) may or may not deny the 
legitimacy of some of the perspeetives within the policy discourse. Thus, Yanow’s 
theory may not actually provide these various communities of meaning an actual role in 
the decision-making process and the decision may not reflect the consent of the governed. 
In addition, because the decision-maker(s) may deny the legitimacy of certain 
perspectives that have been presented, Yanow’s theory also fails to guarantee the 
fulfillment of the criterion of helping to legitimize the process of policy development and 
implementation as democratic. Thus, Yanow’s theory of interpretive policy analysis fails 
to fully overcome the challenge of incorporating a democratic process of decision­
making by failing to fulfill two of the three determining criteria. Her theory is open to 
democraey, but does not require it.
Yanow’s contingent fourth step of intervention also fails to ensure that the decision 
reflects the consent of the governed and that the process of policy development and 
implementation is democratic. According to Yanow, if the analyst wishes to pursue with 
intervention, the analyst may (1) “show implications of different meanings/interpretations 
for policy formulations and/or action,’ (2) ‘show that differences [or conflicts in 
meaning] reflect different ways of seeing [epistemological and ethical differences],’ or 
(3) ‘negotiate/mediate/intervene in some other form to bridge differences (e.g., suggest 
reformulation or reframing [of policy].”*' The analyst may choose to do one or all three 
of these steps of intervention, yet because the decision-maker(s) can still deny the 
legitimacy of certain implications of different meanings, interpretations, or values, of
” Yanow, Table 1.1, 22.
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different ways of seeing, or the analyst’s attempt to reformulate or reframe the policy, 
Yanow’s possible steps of intervention are insufficient for fulfilling the last two criteria.
Stone’s theory also falls short of incorporating a democratic process of decision­
making. According to Stone’s theory, policy analysis is partially deconstructive and 
partially constructive. Her theory holds that policy analysts should first deconstruct the 
various interpretations, meanings, and values that may be associated with alternative 
policy perspectives, and then construct a policy alternative that the analyst believes to be 
the ‘best.’ The ultimate outcome of this process is policy analysis as a strategically 
crafted argument that gives voice to a specific way of understanding and interpreting the 
policy situation. Thus, policy analysts are understood to be political advocates.
Although Stone’s method takes into consideration the various alternative policy 
perspectives that may hold various value claims, her method does so only as a step 
toward making one’s own position or voice stronger. As Stone notes during her example 
of her method in action in regards to affirmative action, “I use the tools of Policy 
Paradox to help me think about affirmative action, understand the politics of the issue, 
analyze and critique the arguments of the other side, and argue persuasively for what I 
believe.”'^ Thus, for Stone’s theory, although differing perspectives (which entail 
various value claims) do come into play within the process of decision-making, they do 
not have an equal voice, since those alternative perspectives are used only to be criticized 
in order to make the analyst’s own position stronger. Stone’s use of the knowledge 
gained from inquiry into value claims is not necessarily to provide an adequately 
informed decision, especially because she suggests that the analyst “state goals
Stone, 385.
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ambiguously and possibly keep some goals secret or hidden’; ‘Keep undesirable 
alternatives off the agenda by not mentioning them’; ‘Make your preferred alternative 
appear to be the only feasible or possible one’; ‘Focus on one part of the causal chain and 
ignore others that would require politically difficult or costly policy actions’; ‘Select from 
the infinite range of consequences only those whose cost and benefits will make your 
preferred course of action look “best”’; and ‘Choose the course of action that hurts 
powerful constituents the least, but portray your decision as creating maximal social good 
for a broad public.”'  ^ Thus, Stone’s theory fails to fulfill the criterion of providing a 
democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately well-informed 
decision to be made.
As an adversarial theory. Stone may argue that by representing a single voice within 
the policy discourse, the process of decision-making may be able to fulfill the first 
criterion, since alternative voices or interpretations, meanings, and values may be 
represented by competing policy analyses. This argument relies on the assumption that 
the process of discourse is free, informed, and democratic.
Some liken this to pluralist assumptions that in a democratic society the process of 
decision-making is necessarily democratic. But, according to Schneider and Ingram, 
critics of pluralist theories “contend that pluralist theory and research have provided an 
idealized view of policy making that no longer or has never been realized in the United 
States, ”*'* and in a society that is defined by dominant and suppressed members, it is not 
true that power and information is fairly distributed, so consent is not necessarily free and
Ibid.
14 Helen Ingram and Anne Larason Schneider, 18.
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informed. As Schneider and Ingram further note, such authors as Ted Lowi offered the 
kind of intense criticisms of past pluralist theories of policy analysis. They explain how, 
“During three decades of writing Lowi has argued that the competition among interest 
groups that pluralist theory holds as a necessary feature of democracy does not exist in 
the United States. Lowi (1964) contended that the pluralist vision of democracy as a 
competition among a large number of relatively equal groups has been replaced with 
‘interest group liberalism’ in which powerful groups capture the policy-making and 
implementation process. Interest group liberalism cannot achieve rational policy results 
(because it is unable to say ‘no’ to anyone) nor can it address issues of justice (because 
the state is mainly the tool of powerful interests).”*^
In addition, as Schneider and Ingram note, “During the formulation phase [of a 
policy], ‘iron triangles’ of interest groups, policy analysts, and legislative staff often 
control the options that will be considered (Lowi 1979). Again, the interest of the less 
powerful may lose out in this process, as the shaping of policy content usually reflects the 
way others have framed the problems. Legislation may be packaged in sueh a way 
during the deliberations within the legislative body that preferences of persons who are 
less attentive lose to those that have full-time lobbyists.”*^  Thus, by inaccurately 
assuming the political forum and the process in which policies are decided upon are 
ideally democratic, Stone’s theory also fails to meet the criterion of accommodating the 
right of the citizen to participate in the decision-making process, thereby being unable to 
ensure that the decision reflects the consent of the governed, and also fails to fulfill the
Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 18-19.
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third criterion of contributing to the legitimization of the process of policy development 
and implementation as democratic.
Thus, Fischer’s theory adequately overcomes the challenge providing a democratic 
process of decision-making. Yanow’s theory marginally overcomes this challenge, and it 
is doubtful that Stone’s theory overcomes this challenge.
The Challenge of Providing a Coherent Theory 
of Policy Analysis
Another criticism of positivist theories of policy analysis is that they are incoherent 
theories in that they attempt to provide a value-neutral analysis of inherently value-laden 
objects of inquiry or by completely obviating the value-laden objects of inquiry. This 
criticism is ultimately about the theory’s consistency with the nature of policy analysis.
As Kuhn notes, “Normal science does and must continually strive to bring theory and fact 
into closer agreement.”*’ Here then, we can understand this criticism as a criticism 
regarding the external coherence of positivist theories; of whether the theories are in 
closer agreement with the nature of policy analysis.
According to the positivist’s definition of policy analysis, the ultimate objective of 
policy analysis is in “choosing the best policy alternative according to an explicit 
decision rule.”** This conception of policy analysis entails a specific choice for the 
policy maker; that choice being one that has been determined by the technocratic policy 
scientist as the ‘best’ policy alternative in light of other alternatives; without any
*’ Kuhn, 80.
** Jenkins-Smith, 11.
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consideration to the possibilities of various value claims that entail various 
interpretations, meanings, and values. Given the claim that the objects of policy analysis 
are inherently value-laden, the positivist policy analysts are unable to resolve this conflict 
between their coneeption of policy analysis and the value-ladenness of the objects of 
inquiry for policy analysis. This is due their ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological tenets that are in inherent contradiction with the conception that the 
objects of policy analysis are value-laden.
For postpositivist theories of policy analysis, the question of coherence is more so 
about internal coherence; the question is whether their methods are consistent with their 
ontological and epistemological tenets—tenets that reflect the value-laden nature of the 
objects of policy analysis. In this sense, the ontological and epistemological tenets held 
by the three theories representing the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique are 
intimately linked to their ability to incorporate a democratic process of decision-making 
that allows a well-informed decision to be made. This is because one must ask, what is 
the purpose of stressing the importance of the value-laden nature of policy analysis? As 
noted, one of the major reasons for acknowledging that value claims (interpretations, 
meanings, and values) can yield knowledge and stressing the importance of this 
knowledge in policy analysis, is due to the recognition that the knowledge gained from 
inquiry into value claims contribute to the process of making an adequately well- 
informed decision.
Although it is also important to incorporate a democratic process of decision-making 
in order to ensure that the decision made by the decision-maker(s) reflects the consent of 
the governed, and helps to legitimize the process of policy development and
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implementation as democratic, these criteria does not necessarily apply when determining 
the coherence of the theories presented. Denying the instrumental use of value claims for 
these purposes do not necessarily undermine the importance of value elaims within the 
process of analysis, it instead adds to the importance of value claims in the process of 
analysis for those societies that consider democracy necessary or good. Yet, denying the 
importance of value claims for the purpose of providing an adequately well informed 
decision does undermine the importance of the instrumental use of the knowledge gained 
from value claims, for theories that do not recognize this importance make the 
ontological and epistemological tenets regarding the importance of value claims a moot 
point. Thus, the first criterion for determining whether a theory provides a democratic 
process of decision-making is also an important criterion for determining the internal 
coherence of the three theories being examined here.
Based on the discussion regarding the challenge of providing a democratic process of 
decision-making, we can conclude that both Yanow and Fischer provide internally 
coherent theories of policy analysis. As discussed, Yanow fulfills the criterion of 
incorporating a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately 
well-informed decision to be made. She does this through her method of mapping the 
architecture of discourse relevant to the policy issue. By doing so, she provides the 
decision-maker(s) with adequate knowledge of the various perspectives within the policy 
discourse; knowledge that the decision-maker(s) can use to make an adequately well 
informed decision.
Also based on the prior diseussions, Fischer is able to provide an internally coherent 
theory of policy analysis. He provides a theory of policy analysis structured around four
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levels of discourse. Through his final three levels of discourse, Fischer fulfills all three 
criteria for determining whether a theory successfully incorporates a democratic process 
of decision-making. By recognizing within these three levels of diseourse the possibility 
of alternative interpretations, meanings, and values, and by providing a space for each 
perspective not only to be heard, but also to discuss their various perspectives and to 
come to a consensus or a decision, Fischer not only provides us with a method of policy 
analysis that is internally coherent, but also provides a theory that is truly democratic.
Also based on prior discussions, we can conclude that Stone’s theory of policy 
analysis is an internally incoherent theory. Although she upholds the ontological and 
epistemological tenets that policy analysis is value-laden, she fails to recognize the 
implications of these tenets to her methods because she fails to incorporate a democratic 
process of decision-making within her theory of policy analysis that provides for an 
adequately well-informed decision. This leads to a method of policy analysis that, 
although recognizes the fact that the objects of inquiry for policy analysis is value-laden; 
thus the nature of policy analysis itself, makes this recognition a moot point. Thus, Stone 
fails to provide an internally coherent theory.
The Challenge of Policy Analysis as Ideology
The last criticism of positivist policy analysis that this thesis will address is the 
criticisms that when positivist policy analysis enters into the policy discourse, it does so 
as an ideological position rooted in specific value claims that entail specific values, 
meanings, and interpretations. According to Fay, this is due to the fact that: (1) positivist 
theories are products of modem industrial society and thus reflect the rationale of modem
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industrial society; (2) that the values they implicitly instill are those not only of modem 
industrial society, but also those of the dominant class of society; and (3) that by 
reflecting the values of the dominant class of society, (4) they reify the basic social 
institutions and customs of society. Yet, the problem with the ideological character of 
positivist policy analysis is not necessarily that it reflects a certain ideology, but more so 
that it conceals the fact that it reflects a specific ideological position because it reports its 
findings as non-ideological. This problem stems from the positivist tenet that knowledge 
is ‘objective’ in regards to the tmth of the statement. The positivist policy analyst claims 
that the product of their analysis is tme, regardless of any ideological perspective. Thus, 
the challenge for the three theories of the hermeneutic critique is to be able to provide a 
theory that resolves this problem of the ideological character of policy analysis.
Yanow, Stone, and Fischer all address this issue. For Yanow’s theory, the process of 
mapping the architecture of the policy discourse resolves the challenge presented by the 
positivist’s problem of the ideological character of poliey analysis. By doing so, her 
theory reveals the underlying framework that makes sense of human artifacts, and 
inquires into the various value claims held by each community of meaning. Stone and 
Fischer also address the challenge presented by the positivist’s problem of the ideological 
character of policy analysis. They, like Yanow, make the ideological character of policy 
analysis explicit hy revealing the underlining principles that entail various interpretations, 
meanings, and values held by the various communities of meaning, stakeholders, or 
alternative analyses. For Stone, this is done not only through the deconstructive process 
of revealing the various ideas behind alternative policy analyses, but also during the 
process of constructing one’s own policy alternative. In the construction of one’s own
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policy alternative, the analyst is to use various ideas as a foundation for their policy 
position. Thus, they explicitly reveal their ideological position when they formulate 
arguments on behalf of their policy alternative and when criticizing alternative policy 
perspectives.
For Fischer, the ideologies of specific policy alternatives are explicated within his 
final level of ideological discourse, through the process of social choice. Although this 
process, according to Fischer, is to be generally undertaken by the political philosopher, 
he notes that for the policy analyst it is important to “show the ways in which policy 
analysis is already set in the context of ideological questions and that policy analysts 
must at minimum be acknowledged consumers of the products of political-philosophical 
analysis.”'^
Thus, although policy analysis still reflects the ideologies held by the various 
communities of meaning, stakeholders, or policy alternatives, all three theories are 
successful in overcoming the challenge of policy analysis as ideology because they 
explicitly reveal the various underlying ideological assumptions. Again, the major 
criticism, as noted above, that leads to the challenge of policy analysis as ideology was 
not that positivist theories of poliey analysis were embedded in an underlying ideological 
framework, but more so that they denied the ideological nature of their analysis. Unlike 
positivist theories of policy analysis, the three theories presented do not claim that the 
resulting analysis is non-ideological, instead they admit to the ideological nature of the 
resulting analysis. Not only this, but they also explicate the various ideological 
principles, frames, or ideas underlining the resulting analysis. By doing so, each theory
19 Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 172.
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successfully resolves the challenge presented by the criticism of positivist policy analysis 
as ideology.
Summary
In this chapter, the three theories of representing the three perspectives of the 
hermeneutic critique were evaluated in terms of whether they were able to overcome 
some of the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general positivist paradigm for 
policy analysis, and its resulting theories. From the evaluations, we were able to 
conclude that only Fischer’s theory was able to fully overcome all four of the challenges 
discussed. Stone’s theory was unable to overcome not only the challenge of providing a 
democratic process of decision-making, but also the challenge of providing an internally 
coherent theory.
Stone’s theory was unable to fulfill all three of the criteria presented for determining 
whether a theory is able to provide for a democratic process of decision-making. Her 
failure to provide a democratic process of decision-making, specifically the failure to 
fulfill the first criterion of providing a process of decision-making that allows for an 
adequately well informed decision to be made, also led to her theory’s inability to 
overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent theory. As noted, the internal 
coherence of a postpositivist theory of policy analysis lies in its ability to provide a 
method of policy analysis that uses the knowledge gained from value claims in a way that 
realizes the importance of this knowledge, which had been established by the denial of 
the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy. The failure to do
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so makes the denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of a fact-value 
dichotomy a moot point.
Yanow’s theory was unable to fully overcome the challenge of providing a 
democratic process of decision making because her theory failed to provide communities 
of meaning effective roles within the decision-making process. Thus, her theory was 
unable to fulfill the two criteria of providing a process of decision-making that reflects 
the consent of the governed or accommodates the right of the citizen to participate in the 
decision-making process, and one which helps to legitimize the process of policy 
development and implementation as democratic. Yet, unlike Stone’s theory, Yanow’s 
theory was still able to overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent 
theory. This was specifically due to her theory’s incorporation of a process of decision­
making that allowed for an adequately well-informed decision to be made. Thus, 
although her theory may be inadequate in comparison to theories that are able to fulfill all 
three criteria of providing a democratic process of decision-making, such as Fischer’s, 
her theory may still be more viable than Stone’s theory or positivist theories of policy 
analysis.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION 
Summary of Chapters 
In Chapter I, I introduced a brief history of policy analysis. In the broad sense of a 
scientific revolution, this chapter introduced a brief history of how the positivist 
paradigm came to be the dominant paradigm within policy analysis, and of how it 
established a time of normal science for policy analysis. We learned that policy analysis 
traces back to the ancient times of the Babylonians, ancient Hebrews, Egyptians, as well 
as ancient groups in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. We also learned that policy 
analysis had a long history of philosophical, political, historical, and social influences. 
One major influenee was Harold Lasswell, deemed the “Modem Day Founder of Policy 
Science.” According to Garson, Laswell presented an “optimistic vision of the 
possibilities of behavioral methods to serve humanistic ends.”* As policy analysis 
continued to evolve from LaswelTs vision, policy analysis became divided into two 
generally distinct theoretical camps -  positivist and postpositivist policy analysis. In the 
1970’s policy analysis in general enjoyed tremendous growth, and during these times, the 
positiv ist paradigm becam e the dom inant paradigm for p olicy  analysis.
In Chapter II, we first looked at the various tenets held by the general positivist 
paradigm for policy analysis. We saw how the positivist paradigm held the ontological
* Garson, 6.
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tenet of the fact-value dichotomy, which led them to the epistemological tenet of the fact- 
value dichotomy that is rooted in the verification criterion of meaning. This led positivist 
theories of policy analysis to conclude that knowledge was centered on understanding the 
universal social laws that may eventually allow one, and society, to control his or her 
social environment. These tenets, along with the positivist’s tenet of the unity of science, 
led to methodological tenets that provided a framework for policy analysis that was 
thought to be analogous to the methods of natural science -  the framework of rational 
decision-making. This framework treats values as given by the decision-maker(s), 
reducible to quantitative analysis, and presupposes that empirical evidence along with the 
criterion of efficiency can lead to the determination of the ‘best’ policy alternative.
We also came to understand, given the criticisms of Fay, and later the criticisms of 
Yanow, Stone, and Fischer, how the tenets of the positivist paradigm for policy analysis 
failed to take into consideration the value-laden nature of policy analysis. Moreover, 
regardless of its claim to be able to provide a value-neutral policy analysis, we learned 
that positivist policy analysis was a political argument—an argument rooted in the 
ideology of modem industrial society that, intentionally or not, reifies the practiees and 
habits of society’s status quo, a status quo that sustains and legitimizes the dominant 
powers over the oppressed. Thus, the positivist paradigm for policy analysis not only 
failed to provide a value-neutral analysis, but it is inherently unable to do so.
These critieisms speak specifically of the positivist paradigm’s inability to make such 
anomalies as competing values, interpretations, and meanings to be anticipated and 
incorporated within its conception of policy analysis. In the broader sense of a scientific 
revolution, these kinds of criticisms led to a period of crisis for the science of policy
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analysis, and led many theorists and practitioners to reject the dominant positivist 
paradigm for alternative paradigms that were thought to be able to resolve these issues 
that positivist paradigms were criticized as not being able to resolve. Thus, these kinds of 
criticisms can also he understood as establishing the pivots on which scientific 
revolutions turn.
These criticisms also presented specific challenges for alternative paradigms for 
policy analysis, and their resulting theories. These challenges must be addressed if 
alternative paradigms are to be able to provide viable alternative theories in contrast to 
those provided by the dominant positivist paradigm. Thus, in Chapter III, I presented 
three theories of policy analysis that represented what Morçôl referred to as the most 
coherent theory stream amongst various postpositivist theories—the theory stream of the 
hermeneutic critique. According to Morçôl, there are three distinguishable but 
overlapping perspectives within the hermeneutic critique: the interpretive/hermeneutic 
perspective, the discourse perspective, and the critical perspective. As a representative of 
the interpretive/hermeneutic perspective, I offered a summary of Yanow’s interpretive 
theory of policy analysis. As a representative of the discourse perspective, I offered a 
summary of Stone’s theory of analysis as craft, and as a representative of the critical 
perspective, I offered a summary of Fischer’s discursive theory of policy analysis.
As the summaries of each of these theories were presented, I also offered brief 
comparisons of each of these theories. Much of the overlapping referred to by Morçôl 
occurs within the ontological and epistemological tenets of the three theories, and their 
use of hermeneutic methods. These overlaps can be attributed to the notion that all three 
theories share a similar paradigm for policy analysis—a general postpositivist paradigm.
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Assuming an alternative paradigm to the general positivist paradigm for policy analysis, 
all three theories deny the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value 
dichotomy, stressing the notion that value claims can yield knowledge.
Methodologically, due to their denial of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the 
fact-value dichotomy, all three theories incorporate hermeneutic methods of inquiry, and 
focus on quasi-causal modes of explanation of social phenomenon. In the broader view 
of a scientific revolution, this chapter introduced an alternative paradigm to the positivist 
paradigm, marking the end of crisis for the science of policy analysis.
From this point we moved on to Chapter IV, in which these three theories were 
evaluated on whether they, founded upon the same general postpositivist paradigm, were 
able to adequately overcome the challenges presented by the criticisms of the general 
positivist paradigm, and its resulting theories. This chapter focused on four major 
challenges for the general postpositivist paradigm, and its resulting theories. These 
challenges were: (1) the challenge of overcoming the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, (2) the challenge of providing a democratic process of 
decision-making within their method of poliey analysis, (3) the challenge of providing a 
coherent theory of policy analysis, and (4) the challenge of resolving the problem of 
policy analysis as ideology.
Within this discussion, we revealed the intimate relationship between the denial of the 
ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy and the need for 
providing a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately well- 
informed decision. This relationship was rooted in the questions concerning the purpose 
or instrumental use of the knowledge gained from value claims (from inquiry into various
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interpretations, values, and meanings), and from the epistemological tenet that knowledge 
from value claims was most important for the analysis of policy. In this sense, the denial 
of the ontological and epistemological tenets of the fact-value dichotomy entailed the 
incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making that allowed for an adequately 
well-informed decision.
One of the conclusions drawn from these diseussions was that only Fischer’s theory 
was able to successfully overcome all four of the challenges presented by the criticisms 
of the general positivist paradigm for policy analysis, and its resulting theories. The 
reason for this is that only Fischer’s theory was able to fully overcome the challenge of 
providing a democratic process of decision-making, while also overcoming the other 
three challenges
Yanow’s theory was unable to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic 
process of decision-making, while being able to overcome the other three challenges.
This was due to her theory’s failure to fulfill the last two criteria for determining whether 
a theory provides a democratic process of decision-making: the criterion of ensuring that 
the decision made reflects the consent of the governed, and the criterion of helping to 
legitimate the process of decision-making as democratic. Although this was not 
detrimental to the internal coherence of her theory, it may he detrimental to the likeliness 
that her theory would be accepted as a viable alternative postpositivist theory in 
comparison to other alternative postpositivist theories that do fulfill these two criteria.
Stone’s theory not only failed to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic 
process of decision-making, but her theory’s inability to do so also led to its failure to 
overcome the challenge of providing an internally coherent theory. By failing to provide
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for a democratic process of decision-making that allowed for an adequately well- 
informed decision, Stone’s theory made the denial of the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy a moot point. Her theory failed to hring the 
ontological and epistemological tenets that value claims can produce knowledge to bear 
important implications for her methods.
It is important to note here that although the three theories presented do share the 
same general paradigm, this does not mean that the rationalization of the paradigmatic 
tenets would be the same. As Kuhn notes, “The determination of shared paradigms is not 
however the determination of shared rules”,’ and as he continues to explain, “[Scientists] 
can, that is, agree in their identification of a paradigm, without agreeing on, or even 
attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it.”  ^ Thus, thé failures of 
Yanow’s and Stone’s theories to overcome all of the challenges presented by the 
criticisms of positivist theories of policy analysis, may not warrant one to reject the 
paradigm they use. Instead, it would warrant one to reject Yanow’s and Stone’s 
interpretation or rationalization of that paradigm.
Also, the fact that Fischer was able to overcome all of the challenges presented by the 
criticisms of positivist policy analysis, may not only suggest the possibility of accepting 
his rationalization of the general paradigm that he shares with Yanow and Stone, but it 
may also may suggest the possibility of accepting the paradigm itself as an adequate 
alternative to the positivist paradigm for policy analysis.
’ Kuhn, 43.
Ibid., 44.
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Thesis Questions Answered
The primary research question for this thesis asked whether postpositivist theories of 
policy analysis, specifically theories representing the three perspectives of the 
hermeneutic critique, were viable alternatives to positivist theories of policy analysis. 
This question involved questions as to whether (1) the theories, eaeh representing one of 
the three perspectives of the hermeneutic critique, undertake to overcome the criticisms 
that positivist theories have been charged. (2) If they did so adequately, then where was 
this success located? In other words, was their success in overcoming the criticisms that 
positivist theories have been charged with due specifically to paradigm shifts? (3) If not, 
at what point did postpositivist theories also succumb to the criticisms faced by positivist 
theories? And, (4) were these postpositivist theories subject to problems of their own, 
possibly arising from their alternative paradigm? Yet, within this question, there was a 
deeper question. Given that these three theories shared the same general paradigm for 
policy analysis, this thesis was also asking; if postpositivist theories were successful in 
overcoming the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories, whether this 
warranted us to reject the positivist paradigm for the general postpositivist paradigm?
It is clear from the summaries of the three theories presented in Chapter III that the 
three theories representing the three perspectives of policy analysis do undertake the task 
of overcoming the criticisms that positivist theories have been charged with. Not only 
this but in Chapter IV, we evaluated whether or not these three theories were in fact able 
to overcome the challenges presented by the criticism of positivist theories of policy 
analysis. We concluded that only Fischer’s interpretive theory was able to overcome all 
four of the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories. Yanow’s and
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Stone’s theories failed to overcome either one or two of the challenges, respectively. In 
comparison, we can establish that the success of Fischer’s theory is primarily located in 
its incorporation of a fully democratic process of decision-making.
This incorporation of a democratic process of decision-making, specifically in that it 
provides for an adequately well-informed decision, although being a shorteoming of 
positivist theories as well, was a significant flaw in Stone’s theory; a flaw that points to a 
crucial aspect of not only her theory, but also of postpositivist theories in general. This 
crucial aspect is that in order to provide an internally coherent theory of policy analysis, 
postpositivist theories that deny the positivist’s ontological and epistemological tenets of 
the fact-value dichotomy, and thereby maintain that policy analysis is a value-laden 
enterprise, must incorporate a democratic process of deeision-making that provides for an 
adequately well-informed decision within their methods. Thus, Stone’s theory is not a 
viable alternative for policy analysis, although Fischer’s and Yanow’s theories may be.
This is a problem that is specifically oriented towards postpositivist theories of policy 
analysis when understood as a problem of internal coherence, since it is only within the 
general postpositivist paradigm where tenets regarding the value-laden nature of policy 
analysis are held—especially the tenet regarding the importance of inquiring into value 
claims, which entail various values, interpretations, and meanings.
Yanow’s theory, although being unable to fully overcome the challenge of providing 
a democratic process of decision-making, was able to provide for a democratic process of 
decision-making that allowed for an adequately well-informed decision. By doing so, she 
was also able to provide an internally coherent theory. Therefore, it can be said that her 
theory may be a viable alternative to positivist theories. Yet, because she fails to fully
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overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process of decision-making, her theory 
may not be a viable alternative in comparison to postpositivist theories that are able to do 
so.
As mentioned in the prior section, although Yanow’s and Stone’s theories failed to 
overcome all four of the challenges presented by the criticisms of positivist theories of 
policy analysis, this is not sufficient proof that the general paradigm they use is not a 
viable alternative to the positivist paradigm of policy analysis. It may be that the failures 
are not a result of their paradigmatic tenets, but more so due to the interpretations or 
rationalizations of these tenets. In comparing Fischer’s theory against Yanow’s and 
Stone’s theories, this seems to be the case.
In addition, the success of Fischer’s theory of policy analysis may also indicate that 
the general paradigm that he shares with Yanow and Stone is a viable alternative to the 
positivist paradigm of policy analysis. Given the proper interpretation or rationalization 
of these paradigmatic tenets, the general postpositivist paradigm may be able to produce a 
theory of policy analysis that is more viable than those theories produced hy the general 
positivist paradigm.
Recommendations
The recommendations listed below are recommendations regarding the formulation of 
adequate theories of policy analysis. These reeommendations are products of the 
evaluative diseussions that occurred in Chapter IV, and the answering of the major thesis 
question in the above sections. They crystallize the lessons learned from this thesis.
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1. The Adoption of a General Postpositivist 
Paradigm
The first recommendation for formulating adequate theories of policy analysis is that 
theories of policy analysis ought to formulate their theories upon the general 
postpositivist paradigm; upon the tenets denying the ontological and epistemological 
tenets of the fact-value dichotomy, the denial of the positivist’s version of the unity of 
science, and the adoption of hermeneutic methods that result in quasi-causal modes of 
explanation. This recommendation is supported not only by the success of Fischer’s 
theory in overcoming the challenges presented by the criticisms of the positivist 
paradigm, but also by the positivist paradigm’s inability to overcome these challenges.
This shift in ontological, epistemological, and methodological tenets—or in 
paradigms—is necessitated by the positivist paradigm’s inability to incorporate or 
address value claims that entail multiple interpretations, meanings, and values inherent 
within policy analysis. As noted in Chapter II, the realization that the objects of policy 
analysis are inherently value-laden, for the positivist paradigm for policy analysis, is 
likened to the discovery of anomalies before scientific revolutions. These anomalies that 
positivist paradigms are unable to provide accounts, also referred to by Kuhn as 
epistemologieal counter-instances, “permit the emergence of a new and different analysis 
of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble.”"*
In policy analysis, this new and different analysis seems to be framed according to the 
general postpositivist paradigm used by all three theories representing the three 
perspectives of the hermeneutic critique. Furthermore, as Kuhn continues, “From a new
Ibid., 78; Ibid.
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theory of scientific knowledge, [the epistemological counter-instances] may seem very 
much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been 
otherwise.”  ^ This is very much the case for the alternative postpositivist paradigm; 
understood within the postpositivist paradigm, the notion of policy analysis as value­
laden could not conceivably have been otherwise.
2. The Importance of a Democratic Process 
of Decision-Making
Second, in the interpretation or rationalization of the general tenets of the general 
postpositivist paradigm—the formulation of a theory—it is recommended that theorists 
pay close attention to providing a democratic process of decision-making, especially in 
providing a democratic process of decision-making that allows for an adequately well- 
informed decision to be made. The failure of Stone’s theory in overcoming the challenge 
of providing an internally coherent theory of policy analysis was located specifically in 
her theory’s inability to overcome the challenge of providing a democratic process of 
decision-making that allows for an adequately well-informed decisions to be made.
I am not assuming that theorists have been overlooking the importance of providing a 
democratic process of decision-making, for there are numerous authors that address the 
importance of democracy to policy analysis. What I am doing is simply highlighting the 
point that the epistemological denial of the fact-value dichotomy entails that a theory of 
policy analysis provide a method of democratic decision-making that provides for a more 
informed decision, and that not doing so would result in an internally incoherent theory.
Ibid.
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It is also important that the last two criteria for providing a democratic process of 
decision-making be fulfilled, if a postpositivist theory wishes to be competitive with 
other postpositivist theories. As we have seen with Yanow’s theory, simply providing a 
theory that fulfills the first criterion, although resulting in an internally coherent theory, 
does not make the theory a viable alternative to postpositivist theories of policy analysis 
that also fulfill that last two criteria. Much of the literature in policy analysis, speaks of 
the importance of a democratic process of decision-making that ensures that the decision 
made by the decision-maker(s) reflects the consent of the governed, and legitimizes the 
process of decision-making as democratic. Thus, a theory of policy analysis that only 
provides a method of democratic decision-making that leads to an adequately well- 
informed decision is not sufficient for it to be accepted as a viable alternative to 
postpositivist theories that are able to fulfill all three of the criteria for providing a 
democratic process of decision-making. It must provide stakeholders or communities of 
meaning an actual effective role in the decision-making process, and contribute to 
ensuring the process of decision-making as legitimate.
3. The Problem with Pluralist’s Assumptions 
of Democracy
A third recommendation, also derived from the discussion regarding the challenge of 
providing a democratic process of decision-making, is that theorists ought to be critical of 
pluralist assumptions when formulating their theories. As we have seen in Chapter IV, 
the failure of Stone’s theory in overcoming the three challenges mentioned, was primarily 
due to her assumption of a pluralist democracy. And, as the criticisms of Lowi, and 
Ingram and Schneider, have shown, the assumptions of pluralist’s notions of democracy
139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are flawed. It is not true that the forum or process of discourse in current democracies, 
such as the United States, is ideally democratic, especially because information and 
power are unequally distributed. Thus the reliance on the pluralist’s conceptions of 
democracy, when formulating a theory of policy analysis, is not advised.
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